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Abstract
We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be
obtained by 1 – memory strategies. First, we present robust examples of games in which
there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained by any 1 –
memory subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, a complete characterization of 1 – memory simple
strategies is provided, and it is employed to establish the following in games with more than
two players each having connected action spaces:
1. all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by an ε – sub-
game perfect equilibrium strategy of 1 – memory,
2. all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately sup-
ported by a 1 – memory subgame equilibrium, and
3. the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds for 1 – memory strategies.
While no further restrictions are needed for the third result to hold in 2 – player games, an
additional restriction is needed for the first two: players must have common punishments.
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1 Introduction
The Folk Theorem of repeated games states that any individually rational payoffs can be sustained
as an equilibrium if the players are sufficiently patient (see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and
Aumann and Shapley (1994)). Such a multiplicity of equilibria arises because in repeated games at
any stage each player can condition his behavior on the past behavior of all the players. Such long
memories are clearly unreasonable.
Even when players are impatient, equilibrium strategies often require them to remember distant
pasts. In fact, Abreu (1988) characterized the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome paths of
discounted repeated games by using simple strategies which satisfy certain incentive conditions.
Specifically, a simple strategy profile induces n + 1 outcome paths (states): the given prescribed
play, and a punishment path for each of the n players. At any stage, unless there has been a
single player deviation, simple strategies make the play continue along the given outcome path. In
the case of a single player deviation, all the other players will punish the deviator with a player
specific outcome path. Thus, in particular, the behavior at a given state of the game may depend
unboundedly on the past. Therefore, because of the extensive memory dependence such simple
equilibria are also often regarded as unappealing when compared with those in which the current
behavior either does not depend on the past or depends at most on the behavior of the last few
periods.
In this paper, we restrict the set of strategies to those that depend only on what has happened
in the previous period. We shall refer to such behavior by 1 – memory strategies (in the literature
they are also known by 1-period recall strategies). We then ask whether or not we can obtain
the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoffs of complete information repeated games with 1 –
memory strategies. We address this issue for the case in which the set of actions available at any
stage of the game is sufficiently ”rich” (the stage game has a large number of actions).1
In Section 3, we first start with some repeated game examples with discounting showing that
the answer to the above question is negative. These examples have SPE payoffs that cannot be
1Sabourian (1998) characterizes the set subgame perfect equilibria with bounded memory for the case of repeated
games with no discounting and finite number of pure actions. Other works on repeated games with limited memory
include Kalai and Stanford (1988), Lehrer (1988), Aumann and Sorin (1989), Lehrer (1994), Neyman and Okada
(1999), Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2002) and Barlo and Carmona (2006).
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obtained with 1 – memory strategies. Moreover, these negative results are robust to perturbations
of stage game payoffs and discount factor. We also show that the equilibrium in the 2 – player
example cannot even be approximately supported as an ε – contemporaneous perfect equilibrium
(ε – CPE) with 1 – memory.2
Despite these strong negative examples, we demonstrate in the rest of the paper that the an-
swer to the above question is affirmative with some appropriate qualifications. Our main results
demonstrate, at least for repeated games with more than 2 players, that strategies with 1-period
memory are approximately enough to obtain all SPE payoffs of discounted repeated games if the
action space at each stage is sufficiently rich. More specifically, if the action spaces are connected
then our approximation results hold, for games with more than two players, in the following three
senses. First, any SPE payoff profile can be supported with a 1 – memory ε – CPE, for all ε > 0.
Second, if an SPE payoff profile is sustained by simple strategies with the property that the in-
centive conditions identified by Abreu (1988) hold strictly, then it can be approximated by a 1 –
memory SPE. Third, for generic games, in the limit as the discount factor converges to one, any
strictly individually rational payoff can be approximated by a 1 – memory SPE. We also show that
a similar result holds without the genericity assumption for the no discounting case. Furthermore,
if 1 – memory strategies can be conditioned on time, the limiting result for the case of the discount
factor converging to one is exact and not only an approximation.
The last sets of results with patient players also hold for 2 – player games. However, as the 2
– player example in Section 3 demonstrates, with arbitrary discount factors, the first two sets of
approximation results obtained for games with more than two players (the ε – CPE approximation
and the approximation of simple strategy equilibria that satisfy the Abreu type incentive conditions
strictly) do not necessarily extend to 2 – player games without further assumptions on the structure
of the equilibria. In Section 5, we demonstrate that these two approximation results also hold for
2 – player games if the equilibrium considered is such that the punishment path induced when one
player deviates is the same as that induced when the other player deviates.
These results, then, suggest, at least for games with more than two player, that the restriction to
2The notion of contemporaneous perfect epsilon equilibrium, introduced and analyzed by Mailath, Postlewaite,
and Samuelson (2005), demands that at every history no single handed deviation pays strictly more than ε than the
equilibrium continuation payoff.
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1 – memory strategies will not place severe limitations on equilibrium payoffs: It is approximately
enough for players to remember what has happened in the previous period in order to obtain any
SPE payoff. Furthermore, our results also demonstrate that the Folk Theorem does not depend on
the ability of players to remember more than the previous period. Thus, as long as players remember
the last period imposing bounds on memory does not reduce the abundance of equilibrium payoffs.
Clearly, not all strategies are 1 – memory strategies. For any equilibrium payoff profile, our
approach involves employing simple strategies which first can be implemented by remembering only
what has happened in the previous period, and second induce (approximately) the same equilibrium
profile. This requires each agent to identify the state of the play with 1 – memory. Such decoding
of the state of play by observing the outcome in the previous period is clearly possible with some
strategies. For example, consider the grim-trigger strategy profile in the infinitely repeated version
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Since in every period players need to know whether or not someone
defected in the first period, such a strategy profile has infinite memory. However, note that the
outcome path it induces can clearly be supported by the following 1 – memory strategy profile:
players start by cooperating; in the following stages of the game, each player cooperates if and only
if they both have cooperated in the previous stage. A more complicated example would be a path
that involves players playing the same action profile a for a finite number of periods T followed by
playing another profile b forever. Again, this path requires at least T – memory in order to know
when to switch to b. However, if there exists T distinct action profiles a1, . . . , aT each generating
payoffs close to those by a, then the path that plays the sequence a1, . . . , aT followed by playing b
forever approximates the original path in terms of payoffs and is implementable with 1 – memory.
This second example indicates that a path may be approximately implementable with 1 – mem-
ory if the set of action profile is sufficiently rich. However, to implement an (equilibrium) strategy
profile with 1 – memory, we need a great deal more than just being able to implement a specific
path. For example, in the case of a simple strategy profile, not only the equilibrium paths and all
the n punishment paths (where n denotes the number of the players) need to be implementable
with 1 – memory, but also it should be the case that (i) the action profiles used in the punishment
phase for any player occurs neither on the equilibrium path nor be used in the punishment phase
for other players, and (ii) any single deviation can be detected by observing the previous period.3
3For instance, it must be the case that a player being punished cannot, by deviating from the action that the
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Otherwise, it may not be possible for players to know the state of play with 1 – memory.
More formally, to rule out such ambiguities, we introduce a critical property, the notion of
confusion proofness of simple strategies. This notion turns out to be both necessary and sufficient
for players to find out in which phase of the n+ 1 paths the play is in by observing only what has
happened in the previous period. In particular, our Proposition 1 establishes that a simple strategy
is 1 – memory if and only if it is confusion-proof.
We then establish our set of approximation results by showing that for any SPE payoff profile
there exists an (ε – ) equilibrium confusion proof simple strategy profile that approximate the
original equilibrium in the three senses mentioned above. In particular, in the discounting case,
payoffs of non-confusion proof simple strategies are approximated by making use of the notion of ε
– strict enforceability of a simple strategy, for any ε ≥ 0. This notion requires that at any date and
state, every player loses less than ε ≥ 0 by conforming with the simple strategy. Then, with the use
of connected action spaces we employ this slack to construct a confusion proof simple strategy profile
with a payoff arbitrarily close to the original one. Indeed, this construction is the key ingredient for
our discounting Folk Theorem with 1 – memory. But, because correlated strategies are not allowed,
the proof of our 1 – memory Folk Theorem becomes considerably more elaborate.
The above approach clearly cannot be applied when agents have a small (finite) number of
actions at each stage of the game (in this case 1 – memory would not be enough to obtain our
results — see Sabourian (1998)). On the other hand, rich (connected) action spaces endow the
agents with the capacity to “code” information about who-deviated-when into their play; thereby,
allow us to establish our results.
Notice, our richness of action space assumption is consistent with most standard games with
infinite action spaces because it is often assumed that the action space is a convex (and hence
connected) subset of some finite dimensional Euclidian space. Since the set of mixed strategies are
also convex, it also follows that our richness assumption is also satisfied in any repeated game (with
finite or infinite pure action space) in which at each stage the players are allowed to choose mixed
strategies and past mixed actions are observable as in Aumann (1964).4
It is very important to point out that replacing memory with a complex set of actions is not
punishments prescribe, give rise to an action profile on the equilibrium outcome.
4We use the term “mixed action” to denote individual randomization over the actions in the stage game.
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sufficient to obtain all equilibria even with a rich action space. The two repeated games examples,
one with two and another with three players, in Section 3 demonstrate this, in addition to showing
that the main difficulties and subtleties that can arise in implementing equilibria with 1 – memory.
In both examples the action space for each player at any stage consists of the set of mixed strategies
over two pure strategies and is therefore convex. Nevertheless, both have SPE payoffs that cannot
be obtained by 1 – memory. These examples are generic since they remain valid for any small
perturbations of the payoffs and/or the discount factor. Furthermore, the 2 – player equilibrium
example cannot even be approximated by a 1 – memory ε – CPE. As a result there is a type of
discontinuity associated with the 3 – player counter-example: even though it cannot be sustained
with 1 – memory SPE strategies, it can be supported by a 1 – memory ε – CPE for all ε > 0.
The explanation for not being able to implement the equilibrium in the 3 – player example with
1 – memory and for the associated discontinuity is that there is no slack in the incentive conditions
for the particular equilibrium payoff we consider; as a result there is no room to code information
about the past into agents’ behavior without violating the incentive conditions. The explanation for
the 2 – player counter-example is that when behavior depend only on the outcome in the preceding
periods, with two players and 1 – memory there are additional confusing instances that might arise
that does not occur when the number of players exceed two: when n > 2, it is considerably easier
to identify single player deviations than it is in the 2 – player case. For instance, consider the
following simple strategy in a 2 – player game: the equilibrium path consists of repetitions of an
action profile (a1, a2) and the punishment path for player 1 (resp., player 2) consists of repetitions
of (b1, b2) (resp., (c1, c2)). When players observe (b1, a2) in the last period, they cannot conclude
whether or not it was player 1 who deviated from the equilibrium path, or if it was player 2 who
deviated from the punishment path of player 1. This is clearly a problem unless both players have
a common punishment path, in which case they do not need know who has deviated. In contrast,
this confusing instance cannot arise with three or more players because, for any two players i and
j, it is always possible to use the last period actions of players other than i and j to find out if i or
j has deviated in the previous period.5
5Nevertheless, confusing instances can still occur in 3 – player games. If a player being punished has an opportunity
to mislead others to believe that in the previous period someone else was being punished (or that they were playing
along the equilibrium path), then such a strategy is not immune to confusion, and therefore, is not 1 – memory.
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Several other papers study the effects of restricting the strategies players can use in repeated
games. The most restrictive assumption is to consider 0 – memory strategies. In those, players play
the same action profile in every period, independently of the past — this corresponds to the notion
of stationary/Markov strategies. Clearly, the stationary subgame perfect equilibria are precisely
those that consist of playing a Nash equilibrium of the stage game at any subgame. Consequently,
it is quite surprising that the next step of dependence on the past, 1 – memory, is approximately
enough to characterize all equilibrium payoffs.
Another important class of repeated strategies are those represented by finite automata. Similar
results to the ones obtained here appeared in Kalai and Stanford (1988), as they have shown that all
subgame equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by finite automata as an approximate
equilibrium for sufficiently large automata. They do not assume that the action space is large
because they allow any finite size automata. Our results are different because we only consider
strategies with one period recall.
Memory in terms of recall used in this paper captures one aspect of complexity of a strategy.
There are clearly other aspects of complexity of a strategy. We do not address these in this paper. In
particular, we obtain our approximation results with 1 – memory/recall by using (cycle) paths that
involve different action profiles at each date. Such paths may be complex if we use an alternative
definition of complexity to the notion of memory (recall) we use in this paper. The objective here
is not to tackle this general issue of complexity but simply to characterize the implications of recall
restriction, and in particular, to explain how, with some qualifications, in repeated games with rich
action spaces players do not need to use much memory: remembering yesterday is almost enough
to support all SPE payoffs.
In Section 2, we provide the notation and the definitions. Section 3 presents two examples.
Section 4 establishes when an outcome path can be obtained with the use of 1 – memory strategies.
The discounting case is analyzed in Sections 5. In Section 6 we discuss our 1 – memory Folk
Theorems. Finally, in Section 7, we consider time-dependent strategies. All the proofs are in the
Appendix.
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2 Notation and Definitions
The stage game:
A normal form game G is defined by G =
(
N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
, where N is a finite set of players,
Si is the set of player i’s actions and ui :
∏
i∈N Si → R is player i’s payoff function.
We assume that Si is a connected and compact metric space and that ui is continuous for all
i ∈ N . Note that if Si is convex, then Si is connected. Therefore, the mixed extension of any finite
normal form game satisfies the above assumptions.6
Let S =
∏
i∈N Si and S−i =
∏
j 6=i Si. Also, for any i ∈ N denote respectively the minmax payoff
and a minmax profile for player i by
vi = min
s−i∈S−i
max
si∈Si
ui(si, s−i),
mi ∈ arg min
s−i∈S−i
max
si∈Si
ui(si, s−i).
If G is a 2 – player game, a mutual minmax profile is m¯ = (m21,m
1
2).
The repeated game:
The supergame G∞ of G consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G. We denote the
action of any player i in G∞ at any date t = 1, 2, 3, . . . by sti ∈ Si. Also, let st = (st1, .., stn) be the
profile of choices at t.
For t ≥ 1, a t – stage history is a sequence ht = (s1, . . . , st). The set of all t – stage histories is
denoted by Ht = S
t (the t – fold Cartesian product of S). We use H0 to represent the initial (0 –
stage) history. The set of all histories is defined by H =
⋃∞
t=0Ht.
For all i ∈ N , player i’s strategy is a function fi : H → Si.7 The set of player i’s strategies is
denoted by Fi, and F =
∏
i∈N Fi is the joint strategy space with a typical element f ∈ F.
Given a strategy fi ∈ Fi and a history h ∈ H, denote the strategy induced at h by fi|h; thus
(fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h, h¯), for every h¯ ∈ H. Also, let f |h = (f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for every f ∈ F and h ∈ H.
Any strategy f ∈ F induces an outcome at any date as follows:
pi1(f) = f(H0) and pi
t(f) = f(pi1(f), . . . , pit−1(f)) for any t > 1.
6More generally, the mixed extension of any normal form game with compact metric strategy spaces and continuous
payoff functions also satisfies the above assumptions.
7Notice that when G refers to the mixed extension of a normal form game, then the strategy in the repeated game
at any period may depend on past randomization choices which in such cases must be publicly observable.
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Denote the set of outcome paths by Π = S × S × · · · and define the outcome path induced by any
strategy profile f ∈ F by pi(f) = {pi1(f), pi2(f), . . .} ∈ Π.
We consider the following memory restriction on the set of strategies in this paper. For any
history h ∈ H, the 1 – period tail of h is T (h) = st if h = (s1, . . . , st) for some t ≥ 1.
Definition 1 A strategy fi ∈ Fi has one period memory (henceforth called 1 – memory) if fi(h) =
fi(h¯) for any two histories h, h¯ ∈ H such that T (h) = T (h¯).
Notice that in the above definition the choice of action at any date t depends only on the last
stage of the supergame and not t; thus, 1 – memory strategies are independent of the calendar time.
We let F 1i be the set of all player i’s strategies with 1 – memory, and F
1 =
∏
i∈N F
1
i .
For all i ∈ N , let Ui : F → R be player i’s payoff function in the supergame of G.
A strategy vector f ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium of G∞ if Ui(f) ≥ Ui(fˆi, f−i) for all i ∈ N and all
fˆi ∈ Fi. A strategy vector f ∈ F is a SPE of G∞ if f |h is a Nash equilibrium for all h ∈ H.
We also define a 1 – memory SPE as a SPE with the additional property that it has 1 – memory.8
3 Two Examples
In this section we present two examples of SPE payoffs that cannot be supported by any 1 – memory
SPE strategy profiles. The first example uses a 2 – player game while the second uses one with 3
players.
3.1 Two Players
Consider the following normal form game:
1\2 a b
a 4,4 2,5
b 5,2 0,0
8Notice that with this definition the equilibrium strategy of each player has 1 – memory but is best amongst
all strategies, including those with memory longer than one. Alternatively, we could have just required optimality
amongst the set of 1 – memory strategies. For the purpose of the results in this paper the two possible definitions
are equivalent.
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Assume that players can randomise. Let Si = [0, 1] for all i = 1, 2, where si ∈ Si is to be
interpreted as the probability assigned by player i to action a. Note that the minmax payoff is 2
for each player. In the case of player 1, it can only be obtained by m1 = (a, b), while m2 = (b, a)
is the only action profile leading to the minmax payoff of player 2. Moreover, both m1 and m2 are
Nash equilibria of the stage game. Finally, the mutual minmax profile is m¯ = (m21,m
1
2) = (b, b).
Now suppose that the above game is played infinitely often. If there are no bounds on the
memory then the payoff of (4, 4) is SPE for any discount factor δ ≥ 1/3. To see this consider the
following grim type pure strategy profile: (i) play (a, a) at each date on the equilibrium path, (ii)
punish deviations from (a, a) by player i = 1, 2 by playing mi forever (once in a punishment state
playing mi further deviations from mi are ignored and the play continues with mi). Clearly, at each
date this strategy profile induces a payoff of 4 for each player. Furthermore, the profile constitutes
a SPE: First, no player wants to deviate from the equilibrium path because 4 ≥ (1 − δ)5 + δ2 for
any δ ≥ 1/3; and second, no player wants to deviate from mi, i = 1, 2, since it is a best reply.
Unfortunately, the above SPE strategy profile cannot be implemented with 1 – memory, even
though the minmax action profiles for both agents are Nash equilibria of the stage game. This is
because the punishment of minmaxing a deviator creates confusing instances if at each stage the
players can only recall the outcome of the previous period. For example, the strategy profile is
ill-defined with 1 – memory if m1 = (b, a) is observed: it cannot be inferred if in the previous period
player 1 has deviated from (a, a) or if player 2 was being punished.
The impact of the 1 – memory restriction is, in fact, more profound than not being able to
implement the above strategy profile. In fact, we show in this section that there does not exist any
1 – memory SPE strategy profile inducing an average payoff of (4, 4) for δ = 1/3. This holds even
when mixed strategies are observable. In Appendix A.1 we also prove that this conclusion is robust
to perturbations in the discount factor, and payoffs simultaneously. Moreover, in Appendix A.2 we
generalize the result to show that the SPE payoff vector of (4, 4) cannot even be approximated by
a 1 – memory ε – CPE.
To establish the result of this section suppose otherwise; then there exists a 1 – memory SPE
f that induces an average payoff of (4, 4) for δ = 1/3. Since we assume mixed strategies are
observable and f has 1 – memory, there exist functions gi : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1] for all i = 1, 2 such that
fi(h) = gi(T (h)) for all h ∈ H \H0.
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Below we will obtain a contradiction in several steps. First, we show that the only way to
obtain an average payoff of (4, 4) is for f to play (a, a) repeatedly forever, i.e. it must be that
fi(H0) = gi(1, 1) = 1 for all i = 1, 2. Let p1 = f1(H0), q1 = f2(H0), pt = g1(pt−1, qt−1) and
qt = g2(pt−1, qt−1) for all t ∈ N. Since U1(f) = U2(f) = 4, it follows that
8 = U1(f) + U2(f) =
2
3
∞∑
t=1
8ptqt + 7(pt(1− qt) + qt(1− pt))
3t−1
. (1)
Now 8ptqt + 7(pt(1− qt) + qt(1− pt)) ≤ 8. Therefore, condition (1) holds only if pt = qt = 1 for all
t ∈ N. But this implies that fi(H0) = gi(1, 1) = 1 for all i = 1, 2.
Next, we show that if player 2 were to deviate from (a, a) by playing b, player 1 must punish by
assigning a zero probability to a in the period following the deviation: g1(1, 0) must equal 0. This
is because, since player 2 can guarantee himself a payoff of 2 in every period, this deviation would
at least yield him a return of (1− δ)5 + (1− δ)δ(4g1(1, 0) + 2(1− g1(1, 0))) + 2δ2 = 4+ 4/9g1(1, 0);
thus, this deviation is not profitable only if g1(1, 0) = 0. By a symmetric argument, g2(0, 1) = 0.
When the play in period 1 is (1, 0), we know that in the next period player 1 must play b.
However, this is rational only if g2(1, 0) is high, otherwise player 1 would be tempted to play a
instead of playing b. In fact, we show next that g2(1, 0) must be at least 1/6 in order for player 1
to punish player 2. To see this, consider for player 1 the strategy f¯1 of playing a in every history:
f¯1(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H. Then,
U1(f¯1, f2|(1, 0)) ≥ (1− δ)(2g2(1, 0) + 2) + 2δ = 2 + 4g2(1, 0)
3
.
Also, we have that
U1(f |(1, 0)) ≤ (1− δ)u1(g1(1, 0), g2(1, 0)) + 5δ = (1− δ)5g2(1, 0) + 5δ = 10g2(1, 0) + 5
3
.
Since f is a SPE, U1(f |(1, 0)) ≥ U1(f¯1, f2|(1, 0)). Hence, g2(1, 0) ≥ 1/6.
At this point the difference between the full memory and 1 – memory case is clear: In the full
memory case a deviation by player 1 from a leads player 2 to choose b forever, while in the 1 –
memory case although it leads player 2 to b in the first period after the deviation, in the second
period after the deviation player 2 would have to play a with a probability of at least 1/6 if 1 were
to play a in the first period after the deviation.
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Consequently, the punishment with 1 – memory is less severe. This implies that a profitable
deviation for player 1 exists: First player 1 chooses b, and then a forever. We obtain the required
contradiction since this deviation delivers player 1 a return of at least
5(1− δ) + 2δ(1− δ) + (4g2(1, 0) + 2(1− g2(1, 0)))δ2(1− δ) + 2δ3 = 4 + 4g2(1, 0)
27
≥ 4 + 2
81
> 4.
3.2 Three Players
Let G be the mixed extension of the following normal form game with three players: all players
have pure action spaces given by Ai = {a, b},
u3(a1, a2, a3) =
 4 if a3 = a and2 if a3 = b.
for all a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2, u1 and u2 are defined by Table 1 above if a3 = a and arbitrarily if
a3 = b.
Clearly, a is a strictly dominant strategy for player 3. Therefore, if f is a SPE, then f3(h) = a
for all h ∈ H; thus, we are effectively in the same situation as in the above subsection. Therefore,
arguing as in the previous section, one can show that (4, 4, 4) is a SPE payoff that cannot be
supported by a 1 – memory SPE for δ = 1/3. Moreover, by the same arguments as in Appendix
A.1, this conclusion is robust to perturbations in the discount factor, and payoffs simultaneously.
4 Confusion-Proof Paths and 1 – Memory
Following Abreu (1988), f ∈ F is a simple strategy profile represented by n+1 paths (pi(0), pi(1), . . . ,
pi(n)) if f specifies: (i) play pi(0) until some player deviates singly from pi(0); (ii) for any j ∈ N , play
pi(j) if the jth player deviates singly from pi(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, where pi(i) is the ongoing previously
specified path; (iii) continue with the ongoing specified path pi(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, if no deviations
occur or if two or more players deviate simultaneously. These strategies are simple because the play
of the game is always in only (n+1) states, namely, in state j ∈ {0, . . . , n} where pi(j),t is played, for
some t ∈ N. In this case, we say that the play is in phase t of state j. A profile (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n))
of n+ 1 outcome paths is subgame perfect if the simple strategy represented by it is a SPE .
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Henceforth, when the meaning is clear, we shall use the term (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) to refer to both
an n + 1 outcome paths as well as to the simple strategy profile represented by these paths. Also,
when referring to a profile of n+1 outcome paths, we shall not always explicitly mention n+1 and
simply refer to it by a profile of outcome paths.
Abreu (1988) used the concept of simple strategies to characterize the set of subgame perfect
equilibria. In this section, we consider simple strategy profiles that can be implemented with 1 –
memory. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of a confusion-proof profile of outcome paths
and show in Proposition 1 below that that a profile of outcome paths can be supported by a 1 –
memory simple strategy if and only if it is confusion proof. The construction used in Proposition 1
is our main tool and is used throughout the paper.
The notion of a confusion-proof profile of outcome paths is motivated by the following observa-
tions. For a profile of simple strategies to be supported by a 1 – memory simple strategy, players
need to find out the correct state of the play by only observing the action profile in the previous
period. This clearly is not always possible. To see this consider a simple strategy represented by the
profile of paths (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)). Then, three kinds of complications can arise if the strategies
have 1 – memory.
The first kind of complication happens when
pi(i),t = pi(j),r for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and t, r ∈ N. (2)
That is, the action profile in phase t of state i is the same as that in phase r of state j . Since
players condition their behavior only last period’s action profile, the players cannot distinguish
between phase t of state i and phase r of state j, and therefore the simple strategy cannot be
implemented, unless pi(i),t+1 = pi(j),r+1.
The second kind of complication arises when
pi
(i),t
−k = pi
(j),r
−k for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, k ∈ N and t, r ∈ N. (3)
In words, every player other than k ∈ N takes the same action in phase t of state i and in phase r of
state j. Then if, for example, the last period’s action profile is pi(j),r, the players would not be able
to deduce whether the play in the previous period was in phase t of state i and player k deviated
to pi
(j),r
k or whether it was in phase r of state j and no deviation occur. Since a deviation by player
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k from pi
(i),t
k to pi
(j),r
k in phase t of state i is impossible to be detected by observing only the action
in the last period, the simple strategy cannot be implemented, unless pi(i),t+1 = pi(j),r+1 = pi(k),1.
The third kind of complication appears when
pi
(i),t
−l,m = pi
(j),r
−l,m for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, l,m ∈ N and t, r ∈ N. (4)
In words, all players other than l and m ∈ N take the same action both in phase t of state i, and
in phase r of state j. Then, if the last period’s action profile is given by (pi
(i),t
l , pi
(j),r
m , (pi
(i),t
k )k 6=l,m) =
(pi
(i),t
l , pi
(j),r
m , (pi
(j),r
k )k 6=l,m), players, looking back one period, can conclude that either player l or
player m has deviated. But, they cannot be certain of the identity of the deviator. Consequently,
both of them must be punished. This requires pi(l) = pi(m).
These observations are formalized below as follows. For any profile of outcome paths (pi(0), pi(1),
. . . , pi(n)) ⊆ Πn+1, let
Ω ({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k ∈ N : pi(i),tk 6= pi(j),rk },
be the set of players whose actions in phase t of stage i and in phase r stage j are different.
Definition 2 A profile (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) ∈ Πn+1 of outcome paths is confusion-proof if for any i, j ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n} and t, r ∈ N the following holds:
1. If Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = ∅, then pi(i),t+1 = pi(j),r+1.
2. If Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k} for some k ∈ N , then pi(i),t+1 = pi(j),r+1 = pi(k),1.
3. If Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k, l} for some k and l ∈ N , then pi(k) = pi(l).
The above observations, which motivated the definition of confusion-proof outcome paths, sug-
gest that confusion-proofness is necessary to support a profile of outcome paths with an 1 – memory
simple strategy. The next Proposition asserts that confusion-proofness is, in fact, not only a neces-
sary but also a sufficient condition to support a profile of outcome paths with 1 – memory.
Proposition 1 A profile of outcome paths is confusion-proof if and only if there exists a 1 – memory
simple strategy represented by it.
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The 1 – memory strategy f supporting the confusion-proof profile of outcome paths (pi(i))i=0,1,...,n
is as follows: If the last period of a given history equals pi(j),t, for some j = 0, 1, . . . , n and t ∈ N,
then player i chooses pi
(j),t+1
i . If only player k ∈ N deviated from the outcome pi(j) in the last
period of the history, then player i chooses pi
(k),1
i . Finally, if more then one player deviated from
the outcome pi(j) in the last period of the history, then player i chooses pi
(j),t+1
i (thus deviations
involving more than one player are ignored). Since f has 1 – memory and has the structure of a
simple strategy, we say that f is a 1 – memory simple strategy. As before, the profile (pi(0), . . . , pi(n))
represents f . The main task of the sufficiency part of the proof of Proposition 1 is to show that f
is well defined, which we show follows from (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) being confusion-proof.
Before turning to the equilibrium characterization with 1 – memory, we shall next provide a set
of easily tractable sufficient conditions for a profile of outcome paths to be confusion-proof.
Lemma 1 A profile of outcome paths (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) is confusion-proof if one of the following
conditions hold:
1. If n ≥ 3, then for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and t, r ∈ N satisfying (i, t) 6= (j, r) the number of
players whose actions in phase t of stage i and in phase r stage j are different is at least three:
|Ω({i, t}, {j, r})| ≥ 3. (5)
2. If n = 2, then
(a) players have the same punishment path:
pi(1) = pi(2); (6)
(b) for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} and t, r ∈ N satisfying (i, t) 6= (j, r) and i = 1⇒ j 6= 2 the actions
of each agent is distinct:
pi
(i),t
l 6= pi(j),rl for any l = 1, 2. (7)
The condition of the above Lemma for the case of three or more players is clearly sufficient for
confusion-proofness. Similarly, if (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) satisfies (6) and (7) in a game with two players,
then for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} and t, r ∈ N such that (i, t) 6= (j, r), it follows that |Ω({i, t}, {j, r})| = 2,
15
except when i, j ∈ {1, 2}. This together with (6) imply that (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) is confusion-proof when
n = 2.
Conditions (5) and (7), however, are not necessary for confusion-proofness in the case when n > 2
and n = 2, respectively. For instance, (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) defined by pi(j),t = s ∈ S for all j ∈ {0, . . . , n}
and t ∈ N is confusion-proof but it does not satisfy these conditions. Also condition (6) is not
necessary for confusion-proofness. To see that, let (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) be defined by pi(j),t = s ∈ S for
all j ∈ {0, 1} and t ∈ N, and by
pi(2),t =
 (s¯1, s2) if t = 1,s if t ≥ 2.
Then, (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) is confusion-proof but pi(1) 6= pi(2). However, as the following remark demon-
strates, with n = 2 the above example is the only possible confusion proof paths that violates
condition (6) and therefore identical punishment paths for both players is almost necessary for
confusion proofness in 2 – player games.
Remark 1 If n = 2 and (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) is confusion-proof, then either pi(1) = pi(2) or there exists
i ∈ N , s = (si, s−i) ∈ S and s¯i ∈ Si such that pi(i),t = s for all t ∈ N and for j ∈ N, j 6= i
pi(j),t =
 (s¯i, s−i) if t = 1,s if t ≥ 2.
As it clear from the above, the analysis of the confusion proof simple paths, and hence 1 –
memory strategies, is considerably different for the case of 2 – player games from that with three or
more players. The basic difference between two cases is similar to that found in the implementation
literature. Here, as in there, when there are only two players, it may not be possible to detect which
of the two players have deviated and as a result both must be punished with the same punishment
path (condition (6)), whenever a deviation is detected.
5 Discounting
In this section, we assume that all agents discount the future returns by a common discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1). Thus the payoff in the supergame G∞(δ) of G is now given by
Ui(f) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ui(pit(f)).
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Also, for any pi ∈ Π, t ∈ N, and i ∈ N , let V ti (pi) = (1 − δ)
∑∞
r=t δ
r−tui(pir) be the continuation
payoff of player i at date t if the outcome path pi is played. For simplicity, we write Vi(pi) instead
of V 1i (pi).
An outcome path pi is a subgame perfect outcome path if there exists a SPE f such that pi = pi(f).
A profile of outcome paths (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) ∈ Πn+1 is weakly enforceable if
V ti (pi
(j)) ≥ (1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
(j),t
−i ) + δVi(pi
(i)) (8)
for all i ∈ N , j ∈ {0, 1, .., n} and t ∈ N.
From Abreu (1988), it is well known that weak enforceability is equivalent to subgame perfection.
More precisely, an outcome path pi(0) is a SPE outcome path if and only if there exists a weakly
enforceable profile of outcome paths (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)).
In our setting we note that, by Proposition 1, any weakly enforceable, confusion-proof profile
of outcome paths can be supported by a 1 – memory simple SPE strategy. In particular, the same
holds for any SPE payoff vector that can be obtained by a confusion-proof profile of outcome paths.
Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that connectedness of strategy spaces is not needed for these
conclusions that are summarized in the following corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Let u be SPE payoff vector that can be supported by a weakly enforceable, confusion-
proof profile of outcome paths. Then, there is a 1 – memory SPE strategy f such that U(f) = u.
In general, as was shown by the examples in Section 3, we cannot support all subgame perfect
payoff vectors by 1 – memory SPE strategies. In fact, the best that can be hoped for is to obtain
them approximately. There are three aspects involved in our approximations. The first involves
the equilibrium concept in question. To that regard, we employ the notion of contemporaneous
ε – perfect equilibrium (ε – CPE) that is formally defined as follows (see Mailath, Postlewaite,
and Samuelson (2005)): For all ε ≥ 0, a strategy profile f ∈ F is a contemporaneous ε – Nash
equilibrium of the supergame of G if for all i ∈ N , V ti (pi(f)) ≥ V ti (pi(fˆi, f−i)) − ε for all t ∈ N and
fˆi ∈ Fi. A strategy vector f ∈ F is a contemporaneous ε – perfect equilibrium of the supergame of
G if f |h is a contemporaneous ε – Nash equilibrium for every h ∈ H.
The second kind of approximation features the distance in the payoff space: given a SPE payoff
vector, can a payoff vector close to it be sustained with a 1 – memory SPE?
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The third approximation concerns the discount factor. With no memory restrictions, the Folk
Theorem states that any strictly individual rational payoff be supported in SPE for δ sufficiently
large. Does the same hold with 1 – memory?
Since any SPE has to be weakly enforceable, it turns out that a slack in the incentive equations
(8) is needed in order to perform the required approximations. This leads us to introduce the notion
ε – strictly enforceability of a SPE payoff vector.
Definition 3 For all ε ≥ 0, a payoff vector u ∈ Rn is a ε – strictly enforceable SPE payoff if there
exists a profile of n+ 1 outcome paths (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)) such that Vi(pˆi
(0)) = ui and
inf
t∈N
(
V ti (pˆi
(j))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pˆi
(j),t
−i ) + δVi(pˆi
(i))
))
> −ε (9)
for all i ∈ N and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
Thus, an equilibrium simple strategy profile that induces an ε – strictly enforceable SPE payoff
is such that at any date and at any history, the maximum gain a player can make from one-period
deviation from the equilibrium strategy is less than ε.
For convenience, if u is an ε – strictly enforceable SPE payoff with ε = 0, we simply say that u
is a strictly enforceable SPE payoff.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that under certain conditions, any ε-strictly enforceable SPE payoff
can be approximately supported with a 1 – memory ε – CPE.
Theorem 1 Let ε ≥ 0 and u be an ε – strictly enforceable SPE payoff vector induced by the simple
strategy profile (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)). Then, for every η > 0 there is a 1 – memory ε – CPE strategy
profile f such that |U(f)− u| < η, provided that either n ≥ 3, or n = 2 and pˆi(1) = pˆi(2).
Remark 2 Note that when ε = 0, Theorem 1 shows that every neighborhood of any strictly en-
forceable SPE payoff profile contains a payoff profile that can be obtained with a 1 – memory SPE
if either n ≥ 3, or n = 2 and pˆi(1) = pˆi(2). Thus, in these cases, we can approximate a payoff profile
using subgame perfection with 1 – memory, if players strictly prefer to follow the associated simple
strategy at every subgame.
Although there are SPE payoff vectors which are not strictly enforceable (not satisfying Defin-
ition 3 for ε = 0), note that any SPE payoff profile is weakly enforceable, and hence is ε –strictly
enforceable for all ε > 0. This simple observation implies the following corollary to Theorem 1.
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Corollary 2 For every SPE payoff vector u ∈ Rn, and every η > 0, there is a 1 – memory η –
CPE strategy profile f such that |U(f) − u| < η, whenever either n ≥ 3, or n = 2 and there exist
a SPE simple strategy described by (pˆi(0), pˆi(1), pˆi(2)) such that pˆi(1) = pˆi(2) and Vi(pˆi
(0)) = ui for all
i ∈ N .
This corollary to Theorem 1 is in the same spirit as Theorem 4.1 of Kalai and Stanford (1988). It
shows that with three more players, given any η > 0, every SPE payoff vector can be approximately
obtained by a 1 – memory η – CPE. In other words, the value of any recall beyond observing the
last period, is arbitrarily small. Moreover, the same conclusion holds for 2 – player games if the
punishment paths needed to enforce the original equilibrium are the same for both players.
The proof of Theorem 1 involves showing that under the assumptions of the Theorem, together
with Si being connected and ui being continuous, the given profile of outcome paths (pˆi
(0), . . . , pˆi(n))
supporting u as an ε – strictly enforceable SPE payoff vector can be approximated by a confusion-
proof profile of outcome paths (p¯i(0), . . . , p¯i(n)), that is arbitrarily close to the first in terms of the
distance in payoffs. This implies that the latter profile of outcome paths is also an ε – strictly
enforceable SPE. Applying Proposition 1 completes the proof.
Theorem 1 establishes that any strictly enforceable utility vector can be approximated by a
1 – memory SPE payoff vector. Can such 1 – memory implementation of strictly enforceable
utility be exact? Clearly, if a strictly enforceable utility vector u has the additional property
that it can be obtained by a confusion proof profile of outcome paths, (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)), then there
exists a 1 – memory simple strategy profile that supports u exactly. Even if (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)) is not
confusion-proof, but is strictly enforceable and the single path pˆi(0) is implementable with 1 – memory
(pˆi(0) does not involve any confusing instances), u can still be sustained exactly by a 1 – memory
SPE. As in the proof of Theorem 1, this can be established by constructing another punishment
profile (p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) such that (pˆi(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) is confusion-proof simple equilibrium and hence
1 – memory implementable.9 To show this formally, we shall next define a confusion-proof single
outcome path and a confusion-proof payoff vector.
A single outcome path pi is free of confusion if it satisfies the following three conditions. First,
if the vector of actions is the same in two different periods, then the action profile in the period
following one of those periods must equal the action profile following the other period. Second, it
9In the next section, we shall use this observation to establish our Folk Theorem type results with 1 – memory.
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cannot be the case that there is exactly one player whose action is different in two given periods.
And third, with more than two players, it cannot be the case that there is exactly two players whose
actions are different in two given periods. These restrictions are described in Definition 4 below,
and are similar to those made in Definition 2. As before, the set of players that in a given outcome
path play a different actions in different periods is a key concept. Formally, for any outcome paths
pi ∈ Π this set is defined by
Ω(t, r) = {i ∈ N : piti 6= piri } for any two periods t and r ∈ N.
Definition 4 A single path pi ∈ Π is confusion-proof if the following properties hold:
1. |Ω(t, r)| = 0 for some t, r ∈ N, implies pit+1 = pir+1.
2. There are no t, r ∈ N with |Ω(t, r)| = 1.
3. If n > 2, then |Ω(t, r)| 6= 2 for all t, r ∈ N.
We define the set of Πcp to be the set of all single confusion-proof paths. Furthermore, a payoff
vector u is confusion-proof if it can supported by a single confusion-proof path: there exists pi ∈ Πcp
such that V (pi) = u.
Using the same techniques as in the proof of Theorem 1 one can prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that u is supported by a single confusion-proof path pi(0) ∈ Πcp. Assume also
that there exists n paths (pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) ∈ Πn such that (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) is strictly enforceable.
Then, there is a 1 – memory SPE strategy f such that U(f) = u, provided that either n ≥ 3, or
n = 2 and pi(1) = pi(2).
Thus, confusion-proof strictly enforceable SPE payoffs are most well-suited for our goal of sup-
porting payoff vectors by 1 – memory SPE strategies. This makes it natural to ask whether we can
describe the set of such payoffs. In the next section, we will provide a partial description of that
set, for all sufficiently large discount factors.
Before considering the case of patient players, we would like to discuss the relation between the
examples presented in Section 3 and the results in this section. In the 3 – player example, recall
that we identified for δ = 1/3 a SPE (and Pareto optimal) payoff vector (4, 4, 4) which cannot be
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supported by any 1 – memory equilibrium (the result was also robust to small perturbations of stage
game payoffs and/or δ). On the other hand, Corollary 2 displays that the same payoff vector can
arbitrarily closely be approximated with a 1 – memory ε – CPE, for all ε > 0. Indeed, it is not very
difficult to show that a stronger result holds: since this payoff can be supported by a confusion-proof
single path (repeating (a, a, a) forever), it can be obtained exactly in ε – CPE with 1 – memory,
for all ε > 0. Therefore, these observations imply that there is a discontinuity in the following
sense: even though the SPE payoff vector (4, 4, 4) can be obtained with a 1 – memory ε – CPE
for all ε > 0, it cannot be exactly sustained with 1 – memory SPE (the same discontinuity holds
if we perturb the stage game payoffs and/or δ). To see the nature of this discontinuity, note that
the payoff profile (4, 4, 4) cannot be obtained with a strictly enforceable simple strategy because
player 3 has a dominant strategy that induces a payoff of 4 at every stage game (therefore, the
continuation payoff of player 3 is the same at every history). This implies that the hypothesis of
Theorem 1 (and Proposition 2) on strict enforceability does not hold for (4, 4, 4) when ε = 0. On
the other hand, when ε exceeds zero the payoff at different histories do not have to be the same,
and as a result, (4, 4, 4) can be obtained as an ε – strictly enforceable simple strategy for ε > 0;
thus in the case of the example the hypothesis of Theorem 1 holds when ε > 0.
Considering the 2 – player example of Section 3, recall that when δ = 1/3 not only we identified
a SPE (and Pareto optimal) payoff vector (4, 4) which cannot be supported by any 1 – memory
SPE (the result is also robust to small perturbations of payoffs and/or δ), we also showed that (4, 4)
cannot even be approximated by a 1 – memory ε – CPE, for small ε > 0.10 Therefore, the conclusions
of the all the main results in this section (Theorem 1, Remark 5, Corollary 2 and Proposition 2)
do not hold for the payoff vector (4, 4) in our 2 – player example. The reason for this is that for
the 2 – player case all the results in this section require a common punishment path; whereas to
enforce the payoff vector (4, 4) (or a payoff close to it) as a SPE in the example requires different
punishment paths for the two players.11
10Thus, in this example there is not even a discontinuity with respect to the ε – CPE.
11Note that the payoff vector (4, 4) in the example when δ = 1/3 is not a strictly enforceable SPE. This implies
that this payoff vector is inconsistent with the hypothesis of Theorem 1, Remark 5 and Proposition 2 for another
reason other than the lack of common punishment paths. However, since the conclusion of the example is robust
to small perturbations of the payoffs, it follows that we can always construct another example in which a strictly
enforceable with different punishment paths cannot be implemented by a 1 – memory SPE, thus, highlighting that
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6 Folk Theorems
6.1 Folk Theorem with Discounting
Let D = co (u(S)), U = {y ∈ D : yi ≥ vi for all i ∈ N} and U0 = {y ∈ D : yi > vi for all i ∈ N}.
The set U (resp. U0) is the set of (resp. strictly) individually rational payoffs.
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)’s Folk Theorem for repeated games with discounting establishes
that any strictly individually rational payoff profiles u ∈ U0 can be sustained as a SPE payoff
profile if the players are sufficiently patient and U has full-dimension (dim(U) = n). However, the
discussion in the previous section shows that a payoff profile u ∈ D can be sustained as a SPE with
1 – memory only if there exists a confusion proof single path that induces u.12 Our first result in
this section shows that if players are sufficiently patient then all u ∈ U0 with this property can be
implemented exactly by a 1 – memory SPE if u is bounded away from the boundary of U0 and the
full-dimensionality condition holds. Using this result, we shall then show that all u ∈ U can be
implemented approximately by a 1 – memory SPE.
Fix any discount factor δ < 1. Then for any α ∈ U0 let Λ(α, δ) ⊆ Π be the set of all single
confusion-proof outcome paths pi ∈ Πcp such that the continuation payoff of every player i at each
date t if pi is played is no less than αi:
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Λ(α, δ) = {pi ∈ Πcp : V ti (pi) ≥ αi for all i ∈ N and t ∈ N}.
Also, denote the set of confusion-proof payoff vectors that are supported by the set Λ(α, δ) by
C(α, δ) = {u ∈ Rn : u = V (pi) for some pi ∈ Λ(α, δ)}.
The next Proposition shows that all payoffs in C(α, δ) can be supported by 1 – memory SPE if
δ is sufficiently high.
Proposition 3 Suppose that either dim(U) = n or n = 2 and U0 6= ∅. Then for all α ∈ U0, there
exists δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ¯ the following holds: for all payoffs u ∈ C(α, δ) there exists
a 1 – memory SPE strategy f with U(f) = u.
the critical factor in the example is the lack of common punishment paths.
12This property clearly holds for all u ∈ D if the payoff space u(S) were convex. In this case D = u(S) and
therefore any payoff vector in D can be obtained by the repetition of the same action profile.
13Note that V ti (pi) depends on the discount factor δ but for ease of exposition we shall not make this explicit.
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Since any payoff u ∈ C(α, δ) can be sustained by a confusion proof single path it follows, by
Proposition 2, that to prove Proposition 3 it is sufficient to show that for sufficiently high discount
factor and any u ∈ C(α, δ) there exists a strictly enforceable simple strategy profile given by
(pi(0), pi(1), ..., pi(n)) such that V (pi(0)) = u, and furthermore, in the 2 – player case the punishment
paths are the same.
If the payoff space u(S) were convex (e.g. if correlated strategies were allowed), demonstrating
the existence of such a strictly enforceable simple strategy profile would be completely standard
and would follow in a relatively straightforward manner using the method developed in Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986) (in this case, as we mentioned in Footnote 6.1, any payoff vector u ∈ D can
be obtained by the repetition of the same actions, and therefore can be trivially sustained by a
confusion-proof single path).
However, in our set-up u(S) is not necessarily convex. This complicates the construction of the
required simple strategy profile (pi(0), pi(1), ..., pi(n)) in the proof of Proposition 3. In particular, to
prove the result with more than two players, we construct, for each player i ∈ N , a punishment
path pi(i) that minmaxes i (plays mi) for T periods and then plays another path pi(i). The path pi(i)
is chosen so that its payoff Vi(pi
(i)) for player i to have the following four properties. First, it is
strictly below the payoff i receives on the equilibrium path at any date (i.e., Vi(pi
(i)) < inft V
t
i (pi
(0))).
Second, it strictly exceeds the minmax payoff for i. Third, it is below its continuation payoff at any
date (i.e., Vi(pi
(i)) ≤ V ti (pi(i)) for all t ∈ N). Fourth, it is below the payoff obtained by punishing
any other player at any date (i.e., Vi(pi
(i)) ≤ V ti (pi(j)) for all j ∈ N \ {i} and all t ∈ N). All
these properties are intuitive. The first guarantees that a player that deviates from the equilibrium
payoff is punished regardless of the date of the deviation. The second and the third display the
typical “stick and carrot” nature of the punishments: players are punished more severely early
on. Finally, the fourth properties gives each player an incentive to punish deviators. Ensuring
these properties without assuming correlated strategies (or more generally without assuming u(S)
is convex) is complicated because each path pi(i) may consist of playing a finite sequence of action
profiles repeatedly; as a result V ti (pi
(i)) may not equal V t
′
i (pi
(i)) for any two dates t and t′. With
correlated strategies the path pi(i) could be constructed in such a way such that it involves playing
a single action profile repeatedly and therefore V ti (pi
(i)) = V t
′
i (pi
(i)) for all t and t′. Therefore, the
above four properties are easier to satisfy in the latter case than in the former (in fact, the third
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property is automatically satisfied in the latter case because since V ti (pi
(i)) = V t
′
i (pi
(i)) for all t and
t′).
In the case of two players, the structure of the proof is the same. However, since the punishment
path needs to be common to both players, it is considerably more difficult task to construct a
common punishment path with the above four properties. In addition, as in Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986), we need to use a mutual minmax action in the initial phase of the punishment path.
Proposition 3 shows that for all α ∈ U0, C(α, δ) is contained in the set of payoffs supported by
1 – memory SPE strategies for large δ. We shall now use this result to establish a 1 – memory Folk
Theorem result for the set of individually rational payoffs U . This is obtained by first establishing
that any u ∈ U can be approximated with a confusion-proof payoff profile in C(α, δ) if δ is sufficiently
close to one.
Lemma 2 Suppose that either dim(U) = n or n = 2 and U0 6= ∅. For all u ∈ U and ζ > 0 there
exists α ∈ U0 and δ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ˜ there is u˜ ∈ C(α, δ) with ||u− u˜|| < ζ.
Combining Proposition 3 and Lemma 2 we obtain the perfect 1 – memory Folk Theorem.
Theorem 2 Suppose that either dim(U) = n or n = 2 and U0 6= ∅. Then, for all u ∈ U and
ζ > 0, there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ∗, there is a 1 – memory SPE strategy f with
||U(f)− u|| < ζ.
6.2 No Discounting
In this section we assume that players do not discount the future and are interested in the long-term
average payoff. The payoff in the supergame G∞(1) of G is now given by:
U∞i (f) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ui(pi
k(f)).
For all pi ∈ Π and i ∈ N , we let V ∞i (pi) = lim infT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 ui(pi
t) be the supergame payoff of
player i when the path pi is implemented. Finally, denote the set of confusion-proof payoffs in the
supergame G∞(1) that can be obtained through the repetition of a cycle by
C = {u ∈ Rn : u = V ∞i (pi) for some pi ∈ Πcp that consists of a repetition of a cycle}.
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We shall now establish a similar Folk Theorem result for the no discounting case to that in the
previous section without assuming the full-dimensionality condition. First, we show that all strictly
individually rational payoffs in C can be supported by a 1 – memory SPE.
Proposition 4 For any payoff profile u ∈ U0 ∩ C there exists a 1 – memory SPE strategy profile
f with U∞(f) = u.
When n > 2, the proof of Proposition 4 for the case of a payoff profile u ∈ U0 ∩ C involves
constructing a confusion proof simple strategy profile (pi(0), ..., pi(n)) such that u = V ∞(pi(0)) and
for each player i ∈ N the punishment path pi(i) involve playing first a finite sequence of action
profiles with a payoff approximately close the minmax payoff vi for player i and then playing the
equilibrium path pi(0). In the case of two players, the punishment phase for the two players are
identical and consists of a finite sequence that involve plays that induce payoffs close to the mutual
minmax payoffs followed by playing the equilibrium path pi(0).
Since any strictly individually rational payoff u ∈ U can be approximated by payoff profiles in
the set U0, we shall next show, using the previous result, that any individually rational payoff u ∈ U
can be approximately implemented by a 1 – memory SPE strategy profile.14
Theorem 3 Suppose that U0 is nonempty. Then, for all u ∈ U and ζ > 0 there exists a 1 –
memory SPE strategy profile f with ‖U∞(f)− u‖ < ζ.
7 Time Dependent Strategies
The notion of a 1 – memory strategy implies that any such strategy cannot depend on the calendar
time. In particular, if pi is the outcome path that a 1 – memory strategy f induces, then pit+1 = pir+1
provided that pit = pir. Thus, either the action profile prescribed in some date never repeats itself,
or it will form a loop. As we have mentioned before, these restrictions imply that, in general, not
all payoff vectors can be supported by 1 – memory strategies.
14By a similar argument as that in the proof of Proposition 4, it can also be shown that any u ∈ int(U0)∩V∞(Πcp)
can also be implemented exactly by a 1 – memory subgame perfect equilibrium profile. This can be established by
first noting that for any such u ∈ int(U0) ∩ V∞(Πcp) there exists another payoff u′ ∈ U0 ∩ C such that u ≥ u′.
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Important differences appear when time dependent 1 – memory strategies are allowed. Formally,
a strategy fi ∈ Fi for player i is a time dependent 1 – memory strategy if fi(h) = fi(h¯) for all
h, h¯ ∈ Ht satisfying T (h) = T (h¯) and all t ∈ N. Thus, a time dependent 1 – memory strategy
allows for fi(h) to differ from fi(h¯) even if T (h) = T (h¯), as long as h and h¯ have different lengths.
Thus, time dependence implies that all outcome paths (and thus all payoff vectors) can be sustained
by time dependent 1 – memory strategy profiles.
We are interested in supporting SPE payoffs with time dependent 1 – memory SPE strategies.
Regarding this goal, similar considerations apply as in Sections 5 with the additional property
that with time dependence we can strengthen our approximate implementation results to exact
implementation. For example, the following is the analogue of Theorem 1 for time dependent 1 –
memory strategies that can be obtained by a similar proof.
Theorem 4 Let ε ≥ 0 and u be an ε – strictly enforceable SPE payoff described by the simple
strategy (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)). Then, there exists a time dependent 1 – memory ε – CPE f with U(f) = u,
provided that either n ≥ 3, or n = 2 and pˆi(1) = pˆi(2).
From the above it should be clear that the advantage of using time dependent strategies is that
payoffs can be supported exactly, and not only approximately. The same applies in the context of
our Folk Theorems. In fact, there is no longer the need to focus on confusion-proof payoffs, since
any payoff can be supported by a time dependent 1 – memory strategy.
Formally, for all δ ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ U0 let Λ˜(α, δ) ⊂ Π be the set of all outcome paths pi ∈ Π such
that V ti (pi) ≥ αi for all i ∈ N and t ∈ N. Also, denote the set of payoff vectors that are supported
by the set Λ˜(α, δ) by
C˜(α, δ) = {u ∈ Rn : u = V (pi, δ) for some pi ∈ Λ˜(α, δ)}.
Then, because any payoff can be supported by a time dependent 1 – memory strategy, the
following analogue of Proposition 3 can be obtained by a similar proof.
Proposition 5 Suppose that either dim(U) = n or n = 2 and U0 6= ∅. Then for all α ∈ U0, there
exists δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ¯ the following holds: for all payoffs u ∈ C˜(α, δ) there exists
time dependent 1 – memory SPE strategy f with U(f, δ) = u.
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Consequently, with the use of time dependent strategies the 1 – memory Folk Theorem can be
stated without any approximations.
Theorem 5 For all payoffs u ∈ int(U0), there exists δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ¯ there exists
time dependent 1 – memory SPE strategy f with U(f, δ) = u.
A Appendix: Robustness of the 2 – player Example
A.1 Perturbing the stage game payoffs and the discount factor
We consider a perturbed version of the original game, where ²1, ²2, ρ1, ρ2 are sufficiently small and
possibly negative:
1\2 a b
a (4 + ²1, 4 + ²2) (2 + ρ1, 5)
b (5, 2 + ρ2) (0, 0)
We will prove that there is an open neighborhood of values for ²1, ²2, ρ1, ρ2 and δ, for which the
(full memory) SPE payoff of (4+ ²1, 4+ ²2) cannot be obtained by any 1 – memory SPE strategies.
As before, si ∈ Si = [0, 1] refers to the action (the probability assigned to a) by player i in the
stage game. Note, also that for sufficiently small values of ²1, ²2, ρ1, ρ2, the minmax payoff is (2+ρi)
for player i, m1 = (a, b), m2 = (b, a) and both m1 and m2 are Nash equilibria. The mutual minmax
profile is m¯ = (m21,m
1
2) = (b, b).
Now suppose the above game is played infinitely often. If there are no restrictions on the memory
then the payoff of (4+ ²1, 4+ ²2) is SPE: play a at each date with the threat of playing m
i forever if
i deviates from (a, a), i = 1, 2 (further deviations are ignored). This strategy profile defined above
is subgame perfect, provided that δ satisfies the following inequality
δ ≥ 1− ²i
3− ρi for all i = 1, 2. (10)
To establish our claim suppose that, contrary to our claim, the payoff of (4 + ²1, 4 + ²2) can be
supported by a 1 – memory SPE f . But then there exists functions gi : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1] for all i = 1, 2
such that fi(h) = gi(T (h)) for all h ∈ H \H0.
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First, we will show that the payoff of (4 + ²1, 4 + ²2) can only be obtained by repeating (a, a)
forever. Let p1 = f1(H0), q1 = f2(H0), pt = g1(pt−1, qt−1) and qt = g2(pt−1, qt−1) for all t ∈ N. Since
U1(f) = 4 + ²1 and U2(f) = 4 + ²2, it follows that
8+
2∑
i=1
²i =
2∑
i=1
Ui(f) = (1−δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1((8+²1+²2)ptqt+(7+ρ1)(pt(1−qt))+(7+ρ2)qt(1−pt))). (11)
Since ((8 + ²1 + ²2)ptqt + (7 + ρ1)(pt(1 − qt)) + (7 + ρ2)qt(1 − pt)) ≤ 8 + ²1 + ²2 for small values
of ²1, ²2, ρ1, ρ2, condition (11) holds only if pt = qt = 1 for all t ∈ N. Hence, it follows that
fi(H0) = gi(1, 1) = 1 for all i = 1, 2.
Next, for any q ∈ S2 = [0, 1] consider a deviation by player 2 to a strategy f¯2 defined by
f¯2(H0) = q and f¯2(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H \H0. Then,
U2(f1, f¯2) ≥ (1− δ)[(4 + ²2)q + 5(1− q)] + (1− δ)δ[(4 + ²2)g1(1, q)
+ (2 + ρ2)(1− g1(1, q))] + (2 + ρ2)δ2
= (1− δ)(5− q + ²2q) + (2 + ρ2)δ + δ(1− δ)(2 + ²2 − ρ2)g1(1, q).
Since f is a SPE, 4 + ²2 = U2(f) ≥ U2(f1, f¯2) implies
g1(1, q) ≤ (1− ²2)q
(2 + ²2 − ρ2)δ +
(3− ρ2)δ + ²2 − 1
(2 + ²2 − ρ2)δ(1− δ) . (12)
Symmetrically, for all p ∈ S1 = [0, 1]
g2(p, 1) ≤ (1− ²1)p
(2 + ²1 − ρ1)δ +
(3− ρ1)δ + ²1 − 1
(2 + ²1 − ρ1)δ(1− δ) . (13)
Consider next the strategy f¯1 for player 1 defined by f¯1(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H. Note that for all
q ∈ S2
U1(f¯1, f2|(1, q)) ≥ (1− δ)[(4 + ²1)g2(1, q) + (2 + ρ1)(1− g2(1, q))] + (2 + ρ1)δ
= (2 + ρ1) + (1− δ)(2 + ²1 − ρ1)g2(1, q).
and
U1(f |(1, q)) ≤ (1− δ)[(4 + ²1)g1(1, q)g2(1, q) + (2 + ρ1)g1(1, q)(1− g2(1, q))
+5(1− g1(1, q))g2(1, q)] + 5δ
= (1− δ)[(2 + ρ1)g1(1, q) + 5g2(1, q)− (3− ²1 + ρ1)g1(1, q)g2(1, q)] + 5δ
≤ (1− δ)[(2 + ρ1)g1(1, q) + 5g2(1, q)] + 5δ.
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Again, since f is SPE we have U1(f |(1, q)) ≥ U1(f¯1, f2|(1, q)). This implies that
g2(1, q) ≥ −(2 + ρ1)g1(1, q)
(3− ²1 + ρ1) +
2 + ρ1 − 5δ
(3− ²1 + ρ1)(1− δ) for all q ∈ S2. (14)
Finally, we use inequalities (12), (13) and (14) to show that player 1 has a profitable deviation
from f , which contradicts the fact that f is a SPE. To show this, consider player 1 deviating from
the equilibrium path by choosing strategy f˜1 defined by f˜1(H0) = 0 and f˜1(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H \H0.
Then,
U1(f˜1, f2) ≥ 5(1− δ) + δ(1− δ)u1(1, g2(0, 1)) + δ2(1− δ)u1(1, g2(1, g2(0, 1))) + (2 + ρ1)δ3
≥ 5(1− δ) + (2 + ρ1)δ + δ2(1− δ)(2 + ²1 − ρ1)g2(1, g2(0, 1)).
The second inequality in the above follows from u1(1, g2(0, 1)) ≥ 2 + ρ1 and u1(1, g2(1, g2(0, 1))) =
(2 + ²1 − ρ1)g2(1, g2(0, 1)) + (2 + ρ1).
Next, we seek a lower bound on g2(1, g2(0, 1)). Note first that, by (13), we have
g2(0, 1) ≤ (3− ρ1)δ + ²1 − 1
(2 + ²1 − ρ1)δ(1− δ) := g¯2(0, 1).
This, together with (12), implies that
g1(1, g2(0, 1)) ≤ (1− ²2)g2(0, 1)
(2 + ²2 − ρ2)δ +
(3− ρ2)δ + ²2 − 1
(2 + ²2 − ρ2)δ(1− δ)
≤ (1− ²2)g¯2(0, 1)
(2 + ²2 − ρ2)δ +
(3− ρ2)δ + ²2 − 1
(2 + ²2 − ρ2)δ(1− δ) := g¯1(1, g¯2(0, 1)).
But then, by (14), we obtain the desired lower bound on g2(1, g2(0, 1)) as follows:
g2(1, g2(0, 1)) ≥ −(2 + ρ1)g1(1, g2(0, 1))
(3− ²1 + ρ1) +
2 + ρ1 − 5δ
(3− ²1 + ρ1)(1− δ) ≥
−(2 + ρ1)g¯1(1, g¯2(0, 1))
(3− ²1 + ρ1) +
2 + ρ1 − 5δ
(3− ²1 + ρ1)(1− δ) := g¯2(1, g¯2(0, 1)).
Using the lower bound g¯2(1, g¯2(0, 1)) for g2(1, g2(0, 1)), we obtain
U1(f˜1, f2) ≥ 5(1− δ) + (2 + ρ1)δ + δ2(1− δ)(2 + ²1 − ρ1)g¯2(1, g¯2(0, 1)).
Now as δ → 1/3, ²j → 0 and ρj → 0 for all j = 1, 2, it follows that g¯2(0, 1)→ 0, g¯1(1, g¯2(0, 1))→
0 and g¯2(1, g¯2(0, 1))→ 1/6, which imply that
5(1− δ) + (2 + ρ1)δ + δ2(1− δ)(2 + ²1 − ρ1)g¯2(1, g¯2(0, 1))→ 4 + 2
81
.
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Therefore, there exists φ∗ > 0, ²∗j > 0, and ρ
∗
j > 0 such that for all |δ − 1/3| < φ∗, |²j| < ²∗j and
|ρj| < ρ∗j we have U1(f˜1, f2) > 4 + ²1, delivering the required contradiction.
Thus, for all values of (δ, ²1, ²2, ρ1, ρ2) which reside in B
1 ∩ B2 where B1 = {(δ, ²1, ²2, ρ1, ρ2) :
4+ ²j > 5δ+(1−δ)(2+ρj), j = 1, 2} and B2 = {(δ, ²1, ²2, ρ1, ρ2) : |δ−1/3| < φ∗, |²j| < ²∗j and |ρj| <
ρ∗j , j = 1, 2}, there exists a SPE payoff which cannot be obtained by 1 – memory SPE.
A.2 Contemporaneous ε – equilibrium approximation
Consider again the case of δ = 1/3 and ²1 = ²2 = ρ1 = ρ2 = 0. We now show that exists η > 0 and
ε′ > 0 such that no feasible payoff profile u ∈ Bη(4, 4) can be supported by a 1 – memory ε – CPE,
for all 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε′.
To show this fix any η > 0 and any feasible payoff profile u ∈ Bη(4, 4). We first show that if
pi = {(pt, qt)}∞t=1 is such that V (pi) = u, then p1 and q1 are both greater or equal to 1− 3η. We shall
demonstrate this for the case of p1; the reasoning for the case of q1 is analogous. Let γ = 1−3η and
Vt = V
t
1 (pi) + V
t
2 (pi), for all t ∈ N. Suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that p1 < γ. Then
V1 =
2
3
(8p1q1 + 7p1(1− q1) + 7q1(1− p1)) + V2
3
=
2
3
(7 + p1q1 − 7(1− p1)(1− q1)) + V2
3
(15)
Note that u ∈ Bη(4, 4) implies that V1 = u1 + u2 > 8− 2η. But then, by (15) and p1 < γ we have
8− 2η < 2
3
(7 + γq1 − 7(1− γ)(1− q1)) + V2
3
=
2
3
(−6γq1 + 7(γ + q1)) + V2
3
.
But this implies that
V2 > 24− 6η + 12γq1 − 14(γ + q1) ≥ 10− 6η − 2γ = 8.
Since V2 ≤ 8, we have a contradiction.
Having shown that when η > 0 is small p1 and q1 are near one, the rest of the proof is similar to
that provided in the previous section. Therefore, as was done before, suppose contrary to our claim
that, for some small η > 0 and ε ≥ 0, the payoff u ∈ Bη(4, 4) can be supported by a 1– memory ε
– CPE f . Then, there exists functions gi : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1] for all i = 1, 2 such that fi(h) = gi(T (h))
for all h ∈ H \H0.
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Now, for any q ∈ S2 consider a deviation by player 2 to a strategy f¯2 defined by f¯2(H0) = q and
f¯2(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H \H0. Then,
U2(f1, f¯2) ≥ (1− δ)[4p1q + 5p1(1− q) + 2(1− p1)q]
+(1− δ)δ[4g1(p1, q) + 2(1− g1(p1, q))] + 2δ2
= (1− δ)(5p1 − 3p1q + 2q) + 2δ + δ(1− δ)2g1(p1, q).
Since f is ε – CPE, 4 + η > U2(f) ≥ U2(f1, f¯2)− ε implies
g1(p1, q) <
4 + η + ε− 2δ
2δ(1− δ) −
5p1 − 3p1q + 2q
2δ
. (16)
Symmetrically, for all p ∈ S1
g2(p, q1) <
4 + η + ε− 2δ
2δ(1− δ) −
5q1 − 3pq1 + 2p
2δ
. (17)
Consider next the strategy f¯1 for player 1 defined by f¯1(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H. Note that
U1(f¯1, f2|(p1, q)) ≥ (1− δ)[4g2(p1, q) + 2(1− g2(p1, q))] + 2δ
= 2 + (1− δ)2g2(p1, q),
for all q ∈ S2, and
U1(f |(p1, q)) ≤ (1− δ)[4g1(p1, q)g2(p1, q) + 2g1(p1, q)(1− g2(p1, q))
+5(1− g1(p1, q))g2(p1, q)] + 5δ ≤ (1− δ)(2g1(p1, q) + 5g2(p1, q)) + 5δ.
Again, since f is ε – CPE we have for all q ∈ S2
g2(p1, q) ≥ −2g1(p1, q)
3
+
2− 5δ − ε
3(1− δ) . (18)
Finally, we use inequalities (16), (17) and (18) to show that for small η and ε player 1 has a prof-
itable deviation from f , which contradicts the fact that f is ε – CPE. To show this, consider player
1 deviating from the equilibrium path by choosing strategy f˜1 defined by f˜1(H0) = 0, f˜1(0, q1) = p1,
and f˜1(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H \ (H0 ∪ {(0, q1)}). Then,
U1(f˜1, f2) ≥ 5q1(1− δ) + δ(1− δ)u1(p1, g2(0, q1)) + δ2(1− δ)u1(1, g2(p1, g2(0, q1))) + 2δ3
≥ 5q1(1− δ) + 2δ + δ2(1− δ)2g2(p1, g2(0, q1))− 2δ(1− δ)(1− p1),
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because u1(p1, g2(0, q1)) ≥ 2p1 and u1(1, g2(p1, g2(0, q1))) = 2g2(p1, g2(0, q1)) + 2.
Next, we seek a lower bound on g2(p1, g2(0, q1)). Note first that, by (17), we have
g2(0, q1) ≤ 4 + η + ε− 2δ
2δ(1− δ) −
5q1
2δ
:= g¯2(0, q1).
This, together with (16), implies that
g1(p1, g2(0, q1)) ≤ 4 + η + ε− 2δ
2δ(1− δ) +
(3p1 − 2)g2(0, q1)− 5p1
2δ
≤ 4 + η + ε− 2δ
2δ(1− δ) +
(3p1 − 2)g¯2(0, q1)− 5p1
2δ
:= g¯1(p1, g¯2(0, q1)),
because for η > 0 small enough, (3p1 − 2) > 0 (due to p1 ≥ 1− 3η). But then, by (18), we obtain
the desired lower bound on g2(p1, g2(0, q1)) as follows:
g2(1, g2(0, 1)) ≥ −2g1(p1, g2(0, q1))
3
+
2− 5δ − ε
3(1− δ)
≥ −2g¯1(p1, g¯2(0, q1))
3
+
2− 5δ − ε
3(1− δ) := g¯2(p1, g¯2(0, q1)).
Using the lower bound g¯2(p1, g¯2(0, q1)) for g2(p1, g2(0, q1)), we obtain
U1(f˜1, f2) ≥ 5q1(1− δ) + 2δ + δ2(1− δ)2g¯2(p1, g¯2(0, q1))− 2δ(1− δ)(1− p1).
Now set δ = 1/3. Then as η → 0 and ε → 0, we have p1 → 1, q1 → 1, g¯2(0, q1) → 0,
g¯1(p1, g¯2(0, q1))→ 0, g¯2(p1, g¯2(0, q1))→ 1/6 and
U1(f˜1, f2)→ 4 + 2
81
.
Since U1(f) < 4+ η, this implies that for η and ε > 0 sufficiently small U1(f˜1, f2) > U1(f) + ε. But
this is a contradiction.
B Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Remark 1. Suppose that (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) is confusion proof. Consider the four possible
values that Ω({1, 1}, {2, 1}) can take. First, note that it cannot be that Ω({1, 1}, {2, 1}) = {1, 2};
otherwise, this means that pi(1),1 6= pi(2),1, while by part 3 of Definition 2 we have pi(1) = pi(2).
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Second, if Ω({1, 1}, {2, 1}) = ∅ then pi(1),1 = pi(2),1. Proceeding by induction, assume that
pi(1),r = pi(2),r for all r = 1, . . . , t− 1. Then, Ω({1, t− 1}, {2, t− 1}) = ∅ implies that pi(1),t = pi(2),t.
Hence, pi(1) = pi(2).
Suppose that Ω({1, 1}, {2, 1}) = {1}, which means that pi(1),11 6= pi(2),11 . By part 2 of Definition 2
we have pi(1),1 = pi(1),2 = pi(2),2. Proceeding by induction as above, one can prove that pi(1),t = pi(1),t+1
for all t ∈ N and that pi(1),t = pi(2),t for all t ≥ 2. This completes the proof, since the remaining case
(Ω({1, 1}, {2, 1}) = {2}) is just analogous to this one.
Proof of Proposition 1. (Sufficiency) Let (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) be a confusion-proof profile of
outcome paths. Let i ∈ N and define fi as follows: for any h ∈ H, j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, l ∈ N and t ∈ N
fi(h) =

pi
(j),t+1
i if T (h) = pi
(j),t,
pi
(l),1
i if T (h) = (sl, pi
(j),t
−l ) and sl 6= pi(j),tl ,
pi
(0),1
i otherwise.
Now we show that f is a well defined function. First, suppose that pi(j),t = pi(k),r for some
k, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and r, t ∈ N. Then, f is well defined if pi(k),r+1 = pi(j),t+1. Since (pi(0), . . . , pi(n))
is confusion-proof, it follows from part 1 of Definition 2 that this is indeed the case.
Second, suppose that pi(k),r = (sl, pi
(j),t
−l ) and sl 6= pi(j),tl for k, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, l ∈ N and
r, t ∈ N. Then, f is well defined only if pi(k),r+1 = pi(l),1. Since (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) is confusion-proof and
Ω({k, r}, {j, t}) = {l}, it follows from part 2 of Definition 2 that this is indeed the case.
Finally, suppose that (sl, pi
(j),t
−l ) = (sk, pi
(m),r
−k ), sk 6= pi(m),rk and sl 6= pi(j),t for some j,m ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n}, k, l ∈ N and r, t ∈ N. Then f is well defined only if pi(l),1 = pi(k),1. Note that it
must be that sl = pi
(m),r
l and sk = pi
(j),t
k . Hence, pi
(m),r
l 6= pi(j),tl and pi(m),rk 6= pi(j),tk , implying that
Ω({m, r}, {j, t}) = {k, l}. Since (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) is confusion-proof, it follows from part 3 of Definition
2 that pi(l),1 = pi(k),1.
It is clear that the strategy f = (f1 . . . , fn) has 1 – memory, since, by definition, fi depends only
on T (h) for all i ∈ N .
Note, also that f has the following property: pi(f) = pi(0) and if player i ∈ N deviates unilaterally
in phase t in any state j, then pi(i) will be played starting from period t + 1. Therefore, f defined
by (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) is a 1 – memory simple strategy.
(Necessity) Let f be a 1 – memory simple strategy represented by (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)). Let i, j ∈
{0, . . . , n} and t, r ∈ N.
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Suppose that Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = ∅. Then, pi(i),t = pi(j),r. Let h1 = (pi(i),t) and h2 = (pi(j),r). Since
T (h1) = h1 = h2 = T (h2) and f has 1 – memory, we have f(h1) = f(h2). But then part 1 of
Definition 2 is satisfied because f(h1) = pi
(i),t+1 and f(h2) = pi
(j),r+1.
Suppose next that Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k} for some k ∈ N . Then, pi(i),tl = pi(j),rl for all l 6= k,
while pi
(i),t
k 6= pi(j),rk . Consider sk = pi(i),tk and s¯k = pi(j),rk . Then, (sk, pi(j),r−k ) = pi(i),t and since f is a 1
– memory simple strategy, it follows that
pi(k),1 = f((sk, pi
(j),r
−k )) = f(pi
(i),t) = pi(i),t+1.
Similarly, (s¯k, pi
(i),t
−k ) = pi
(j),r and so,
pi(k),1 = f((s¯k, pi
(i),t
−k )) = f(pi
(j),r) = pi(j),r+1.
Hence, pi(k),1 = pi(j),r+1 = pi(i),t+1 and part 2 of Definition 2 is satisfied.
Finally, suppose that Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k, l} for some k, l ∈ N . Then, pi(i),tm = pi(j),rm for all
m /∈ {k, l}, while pi(i),tk 6= pi(j),rk and pi(i),tl 6= pi(j),rl . Consider sk = pi(j),rk and sl = pi(i),tl . Then,
(sl, pi
(j),r
−l ) = (sk, pi
(i),t
−k ) and since f is a 1 – memory simple strategy, it follows that
pi(l),1 = f((sl, pi
(j),r
−l )) = f((sk, pi
(i),t
−k )) = pi
(k),1.
Hence, by induction, pi(l) = pi(k) and part 3 of Definition 2 is satisfied.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ε ≥ 0, η > 0 and u be an ε – strictly enforceable SPE payoff vector
decribed by (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)). For all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and i ∈ N , define ζ(j)i by
ζ
(j)
i = inf
t∈N
(
V ti (pˆi
(j))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pˆi
(j),t
−i ) + δVi(pˆi
(i))
))
.
Let γ be defined by
γ = min
{
η,
1
2
(
min
j∈{0,1,...,n},i∈N
{ζ(j)i }+ ε
)}
. (19)
It follows that γ > 0 since η > 0 and u is an ε – strictly enforceable SPE payoff vector.
Let ψ > 0 be such that d(x, y) < ψ implies |ui(x) − ui(y)| < γ and |maxzi ui(zi, x−i) −
maxzi ui(zi, y−i)| < γ, for all i ∈ N . Since Si is connected for all i ∈ N it follows that for every
j = 0, 1, . . . n and t ∈ N, Bψ(pˆi(j),t) ∩ S is uncountable. Thus, we can construct a simple outcome
paths (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) satisfying the conditions described in Lemma 1. Thus, (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n))
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is confusion proof. Therefore, by Proposition 1, there exists a 1 – memory strategy profile f that is
represented by it. Moreover, γ ≤ η implies |Ui(f)− ui| = |Vi(p¯i(0))− Vi(pˆi(0))| < η for all i.
To complete the proof we need to show f is ε – CPE. Fix any t ∈ N, i ∈ N and j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
Since V ti (pˆi
(j))− γ < V ti (p¯i(j)), Vi(p¯i(i)) < Vi(pˆi(i)) + γ and maxsi ui(si, p¯i(j),t−i ) < maxsi ui(si, pˆi(j),t−i ) + γ,
it follows from (19) that
V ti (p¯i
(j))− (1− δ)max
si
ui(si, p¯i
(j),t
−i )− δVi(p¯i(i)) >
V ti (pˆi
(j))− (1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pˆi
(j),t
−i )− δVi(pˆi(i))− 2γ ≥ ζ(j)i − 2γ ≥ 2γ − ε− 2γ = −ε.
Hence, it does not pay player i to deviate from the path induced by state (j) by more than ε. Thus,
f is a confusion-proof ε – CPE.
Proof of Proposition 3. We consider the two cases of n ≥ 3 (Case A) and the n = 2 (Case
B) separately.
Case A: n ≥ 3 and dim(U) = n.
For convenience, in this case we normalize payoffs so that vi = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Fix any α ∈ U0. Then, by Theorem 1 (Step 1) in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994), for all i ∈ N
there exists yi ∈ U0 satisfying the following property: for all i, j ∈ N with j 6= i, yii < αi and
yii < y
j
i .
Define γ′i > 0 to be such that 2γ
′
i = min{αi, {yji }j 6=i} − yii. Let α′i = yii + γ′i for each i. Clearly,
γ′i < α
′
i < αi. Also, by the properties of (y
1, . . . , yn) we have γ′i > 0 for all i.
Next, let γ = minimin{γ′i, yii} and M = maximaxs∈S |ui(s)|. Also, suppose T ∈ N is such that
T ≥ 4M
γ
=
M
γ/4
, (20)
Denote Dk to be the set of achievable payoff in the finite game that consists of repeating the
one-shot game k times, and in which payoffs consist of the average of the payoffs obtained in the
k stages. Also, let K ∈ N be such that D ⊆ ∪x∈DKBγ/2(x) (see Sorin (1992, Proposition 1.3.)).
Finally, denote δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) to be such that δ ≥ δ¯ implies
1− δT+1
1− δ > T, (21)
δT
1− δT >
8M
γ
=
2M
γ/4
and (22)
sup
x∈[−M−γ,M+γ]K
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δK
K∑
k=1
δk−1xk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
xk
∣∣∣∣∣ < γ4 . (23)
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Now fix any δ ≥ δ¯ and consider any u ∈ C(α, δ). We will show that there is a 1 – memory SPE
strategy profile f with U(f) = u.
Let pi ∈ Λ(α, δ) be such that it satisfies Vi(pi, δ) = ui for all i ∈ N . Since pi is a confusion-proof
single path, by Proposition 2, to complete the proof and show that u can be sustained by a 1
– memory SPE it is sufficient to establish that there exists a strictly enforceable simple strategy
profile given by (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) such that pi(0) = pi.
We first start by constructing for each player i a punishment path pi(i). This path consists
of playing mi for the first T periods followed by a path pi(i) yielding a payoff to player i that is
less than α′i and bounded away from zero (the minmax payoff) by γ/4. Furthermore, we need
V ti (pi
(i)) ≥ Vi(pi(i)) for all i ∈ N and t ∈ N to prevent player i to deviate at latter stages of his
punishment path.
To construct such a path, let xi ∈ DK be such that ‖xi − yi‖ < γ/2 for all i ∈ N . Then, by the
definitions of yi, α′i, γ
′
i and γ, the following hold for all i:
xii < y
i
i +
γ
2
= α′i − γ′i +
γ
2
≤ α′i −
γ
2
; (24)
xii > y
i
i −
γ
2
≥ γ − γ
2
=
γ
2
; (25)
xji > y
j
i −
γ
2
≥ yii + 2γ′i −
γ
2
= α′i + γ
′
i −
γ
2
≥ α′i +
γ
2
. (26)
Now, let {si,k}Kk=1 be such that
1
K
K∑
k=1
uj(s
i,k) = xij,
for all i, j ∈ N . Next, consider any t∗ such that
t∗ ∈ arg min
1≤t≤K
1− δ
1− δK
[
K∑
k=t
δk−tui(si,k) +
t−1∑
k=1
δk+T−tui(si,k)
]
,
Let pi(i) consist of repetitions of (si,t
∗
, si,t
∗+1, . . . , si,K , si,1, . . . , si,t
∗−1). Then
V ti (pi
(i)) ≥ Vi(pi(i)) for all i and t. (27)
Also, using (23), it follows, respectively, from (24), (25) and (26) that for all i
Vi(pi
(i)) < xii +
γ
4
< α′i −
γ
2
+
γ
4
< α′i, (28)
Vi(pi
(i)) > xii −
γ
4
>
γ
2
− γ
4
=
γ
4
and (29)
V ti (pi
(j)) > xji −
γ
4
> α′i +
γ
2
− γ
4
= α′i +
γ
4
> Vi(pi
(i)) for all t and j 6= i. (30)
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Finally, let pi(0) = pi and define the path pi(i) by
pi(i),t =
 mi if t ≤ T,pi(i),t−T if t > T.
We now show that the simple strategy defined by (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) supports u as a strictly enforceable
SPE payoff.
Let i ∈ N be given. First, consider player i deviating from the equilibrium path pi(0) = pi in
period t. Then we have
V ti (pi)−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
t
−i) + δVi(pi
(i))
)
= V ti (pi)−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
t
−i) + δ
T+1Vi(pi
(i))
)
> α′i −
(
(1− δ)M + δT+1α′i
)
.
(The equality in the above follows from Vi(pi
(i)) = δTVi(pi
(i)) and the inequality from V ti (pi) ≥ αi > α′i
and from (28).) But then since α′i > (1− δ)M + δT+1α′i is equivalent to
1− δT+1
1− δ >
M
α′i
,
and, by (21), (20) and the definition of γ,
1− δT+1
1− δ > T ≥
M
γ/4
≥ M
α′i
,
it follows that
inf
t
[
V ti (pi)−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
(0),t
−i ) + δVi(pi
(i))
)]
> 0.
Second, consider a deviation from pi(i),t. If t ≤ T we have that
V ti (pi
(i))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si,m
i
−i) + δVi(pi
(i))
)
= δT+1−tVi(pi(i))− δT+1Vi(pi(i)) > 0.
(This follows from Vi(pi
(i)) = δTVi(pi
(i)), maxsi ui(si,m
i
−i) = 0 and Vi(pi
(i)) > 0.) If t > T , then
V ti (pi
(i))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
(i),t
−i ) + δVi(pi
(i))
)
= V t−Ti (pi
(i))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
(i),t
−i ) + δ
T+1Vi(pi
(i))
)
≥ Vi(pi(i))−
(
(1− δ)M + δT+1Vi(pi(i))
)
.
(The inequality in the above follow from (27).) Since Vi(pi
(i)) > (1−δ)M+δT+1Vi(pi(i)) is equivalent
to
1− δT+1
1− δ >
M
Vi(pi(i))
,
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and, by (20), (21) and (29),
1− δT+1
1− δ > T ≥
M
γ/4
>
M
Vi(pi(i))
,
it follows that
inf
t
[
V ti (pi
(i))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
(i),t
−i ) + δVi(pi
(i))
)]
> 0.
Finally, consider a deviation from pi(j),t, j 6= i. If t > T , then it follows from (30) that
V ti (pi
(j))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si,m
j
−i) + δVi(pi
(i))
)
= V t−Ti (pi
(j))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si,m
j
−i) + δ
T+1Vi(pi
(i))
)
> Vi(pi
(i))− ((1− δ)M + δT+1Vi(pi(i))) > 0.
If t ≤ T , then again using (28) and (30) we have
V ti (pi
(j))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si,m
j
−i) + δVi(pi
(i))
)
= (1− δT+1−t)ui(mj) + δT+1−tVi(pi(j))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si,m
j
−i) + δ
T+1Vi(pi
(i))
)
> −(1− δT+1−t)M + δT+1−t(α′i +
γ
4
)− ((1− δ)M + δT+1α′i)
> −(1− δT )M + δT (α′i +
γ
4
)− ((1− δ)M + δT+1α′i)
> −(1− δT )M + δT γ
4
− (1− δ)M.
(The last inequality in the above expression follows from α′i > 0.) But by (22) we have δ
T γ
4
>
2(1− δT )M > (1− δ)M + (1− δT )M. Thus,
inf
t
[
V ti (pi
(j))−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
(j),t
−i ) + δVi(pi
(i))
)]
> 0.
This shows that that the simple strategy described by (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) above is strictly enforce-
able. Since pi(0) = pi this completes the proof of the Proposition for the case of n ≥ 3.
Case B: n = 2.
Let m¯ = (m21,m
1
2) be the mutual minmax profile. Clearly, vi ≥ ui(m¯). For convenience, in this
case we normalize payoffs so that ui(m¯) = 0 for both i = 1, 2.
Let α ∈ U0. Since U0 is convex and αi > vi ≥ ui(m¯) = 0 for all i, there exists y ∈ U0 such that
αi > yi > vi. Fix any such y.
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Define εi = min{αi − yi, yi − vi} > 0 and γ = mini εi/4. Fix any ξ > 0 such that
ξ < min
{
γ,
γ2
2M
}
, (31)
where, as before, M = maxi=1,2maxs |ui(s)|. Clearly, the following two conditions hold:
yi − ξ > vi + 3γ, for all i (32)
yi + ξ < αi, for all i. (33)
Let K ∈ N be such that D ⊆ ∪x∈DKBξ/2(x) (see Sorin (1992, Proposition 1.3.)), T ∈ N be such
that
T >
M
γ
(34)
and δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) be such that for all δ ∈ [δ¯, 1)
1− δT+1
1− δ > T, (35)
δT >
M
M + γ
, (36)
1− δ < γ
2M
and (37)
sup
x∈[−M,M ]K
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δK
K∑
k=1
δk−1xk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
xk
∣∣∣∣∣ < ξ2 . (38)
Now fix any δ ≥ δ¯ and consider any u ∈ C(α, δ). We will show that there is a 1 – memory SPE
strategy f with U(f, δ) = u.
Let pi ∈ Λ(α, δ) be such that it satisfies Vi(pi, δ) = ui for all i ∈ N . Since pi is a confusion-proof
single path, by Proposition 2, to complete the proof and show that u can be sustained by a 1
– memory SPE it is sufficient to establish that there exists a strictly enforceable simple strategy
profile given by (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) such that pi(0) = pi and pi(1) = pi(2).
We first start by constructing a common punishment path pi = pi(1) = pi(2). This path consists
of playing m¯ for the first T periods followed by a path pˆi yielding a payoff to each player i that is
less than αi and bounded away from the minmax payoff vi by γ. Furthermore, pˆi must be such that
V ti (pˆi) ≥ Vi(pˆi) for all i and t to prevent player i to deviate at latter stages of his punishment path.
By (38), let x ∈ DK be such that ||x− y|| < ξ/2. Let {sk}Kk=1 be such that
1
K
K∑
k=1
ui(s
k) = xi
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for all i ∈ N . Then, let p˜i consist of repetitions of (s1, . . . , sK) and let
zi = Vi(p˜i)
for all i ∈ N . Note that ‖x − V t(p˜i)‖ < ξ/2 for all t ∈ N by (38). In particular, we have that
‖x− z‖ < ξ/2 and ‖z − V t(p˜i)‖ ≤ ‖z − x‖+ ‖x− V t(p˜i)‖ < ξ and so
V ti (p˜i) > zi − ξ, for all t and i. (39)
Furthermore,
αi > zi > vi + 2γ, for all i. (40)
The first inequality in (40) follows from zi = Vi(p˜i) < xi +
ξ
2
< yi + ξ and condition (33), and the
second follows from zi > xi − ξ > xi − γ > yi − ξ − γ and condition (32).
We now define pˆi as follows: it consists of playing m¯ for the first R periods, for some some R ∈ N
satisfying
vi + γ < δ
Rzi < zi − ξ, for all i = 1, 2, (41)
followed by playing the sequence {s1, . . . , sK} repeatedly. Thus,
pˆit =
 m¯ if t ≤ R,p˜it−T if t > R
Before proceeding further with the construction of equilibrium strategy, we shall next establish the
existence of a number R ∈ N with the above property in the following claim.
Claim 1 There exists R ∈ N satisfying (41).
Proof of Claim 1. Let
a = max
i
vi + γ
zi
, b = 1− ξ
mini vi + γ
and l = b− a.
Then, it follows that
l = 1−max
i
vi + γ
zi
− ξ
mini vi + γ
>
γ
M
− ξ
mini vi + γ
≥ γ
M
− ξ
γ
≥ γ
M
− γ
2M
=
γ
2M
> 0.
The first and the third inequality in the above follow respectively from zi > vi + 2γ (by (40)) and
ξ < γ
2
2M
(by the definition of ξ). This, together with γ
2M
> 1− δ (condition (37)), imply that
l > 1− δ ≥ δr(1− δ) = δr − δr+1 for all r ∈ N0. (42)
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Next, we show that there exists R ∈ N such that δR ∈ (a, b). First, note that δ0 = 1 > b and δL < a
for L sufficiently large. Let r be the smallest integer in N0 such that δr ≥ b. Then δr+1 < b, by
definition. Moreover, δr+1 > a; otherwise, δr − δr+1 ≥ b − a = l, but this contradicts (42). Thus,
δr+1 ∈ (a, b).
Now since δR ∈ (a, b), it then follows that for any i = 1, 2
vi + γ
zi
≤ max
j
vj + γ
zj
< δR < 1− ξ
minj vj + γ
≤ 1− ξ
vi + γ
.
Hence, vi+γ < δ
Rzi. Also, since by (40) zi > vi+2γ, it follows that δ
R < 1− ξ
zi
; so δRzi < zi− ξ.
Next define the common punishment path p¯i by
p¯it =
 m¯ if t ≤ T,pˆit−T if t > T
Note that V T+1i (p¯i) = Vi(pˆi) = δ
Rzi. Thus, we have from (41) and αi > zi (by (40)) that
αi > Vi(pˆi) > vi + γ, for any i = 1, 2 (43)
Also, by (39) and (41)
V ti (p¯i) = V
t−T
i (pi) ≥ Vi(pi) for any t > T and i = 1, 2. (44)
Now using the properties described in (43) and (44) we will next show that the simple strategy
(pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) where pi(0) = pi and pi(i) = p¯i for all i = 1, 2 supports u as a strictly enforceable SPE.
Fix any i = 1, 2. First, consider player i deviating from the equilibrium path pi(0) = pi in period
t. Then we have
V ti (pi)−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
t
−i) + δVi(p¯i)
)
= V ti (pi)−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
t
−i) + δ
T+1Vi(pi)
)
> αi −
(
(1− δ)M + δT+1αi
)
.
(The equality in the above follows from Vi(p¯i) = δ
TVi(pi), the inequality from pi ∈ Λ(α, δ) and (43).)
Since αi > (1− δ)M + δT+1αi is equivalent to 1−δT+11−δ > Mαi , and
1− δT+1
1− δ > T >
M
γ
≥ M
αi
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(which holds by (34), (35) and since αi − vi ≥ αi − yi > γ), it follows that
inf
t
[
V ti (pi)−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, pi
t
−i) + δVi(p¯i)
)]
> 0.
Second, consider a deviation by i from p¯it. If t ≤ T we have that
V ti (p¯i)−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si,m
i
−i) + δVi(p¯i)
)
= δT+1−tVi(pi)− (1− δ)vi + δT+1Vi(pi)
≥ δTVi(pi)−
(
(1− δ)vi + δT+1Vi(pi)
)
.
Since, by (36) and (43), δT > M
M+γ
≥ vi
vi+γ
> vi
Vi(bpi) , it follows that δTVi(pi)−((1− δ)vi + δT+1Vi(pi)) >
0.
If t > T we have from (44) that
V ti (p¯i)−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, p¯i
t
−i) + δVi(p¯i)
)
≥ Vi(pi)−
(
(1− δ)M + δT+1Vi(pi)
)
.
Since Vi(pi) > (1− δ)M + δT+1Vi(pi) is equivalent to 1−δT+11−δ > MVi(bpi) , and
1− δT+1
1− δ > T >
M
γ
>
M
Vi(pi)
,
(which holds which holds by (34), (35) and (43)), it follows that
inf
t
[
V ti (p¯i)−
(
(1− δ)max
si
ui(si, p¯i
t
−i) + δVi(p¯i)
)]
> 0.
This concludes the proof that the simple strategy described above by (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) with pi(0) = pi
and pi(1) = pi(2) = pi is strictly enforceable and induces a payoff of u. This completes the proof of
the case n = 2 and, thus, of Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix any u ∈ U and any ζ > 0. Now we make two claims.
Claim 2 There exists y, α ∈ U0 such that ||y − u|| < ζ/4 and yi > αi for all i.
We shall prove this Claim 2 for the two cases of dim(U) = n and n = 2 separately.
Case A: dim(U) = n.
In this case we shall first prove that there exists u¯ ∈ int(U0). By Theorem 6.2 in Rockafellar
(1970), dim(U) = n implies that there exists u ∈ int(U). Let ε > 0 be such that Bε(u) ⊆ U . Define
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u¯ by ui = ui + ε/2 for all i. Note that Bε/2(u¯) ⊆ int(U0): if ||u˜− u¯|| < ε/2, then ||u˜− u|| < ε and
so u˜ ∈ U ; furthermore, u˜i > u¯i − ε/2 = ui ≥ vi and so u˜ ∈ U0. This implies that u¯ ∈ int(U0).
Next, we show that there exists y ∈ int(U0) such that ||y−u|| < ζ/4. Define uk = 1
k
u¯+
(
1− 1
k
)
u.
Since uki > vi for all i, u
k ∈ U0. Furthermore, by Theorem 6.1 in Rockafellar (1970) uk ∈ int(U).
So Bρ(u
k) ⊆ U0 for some ρ > 0, i.e., uk ∈ int(U0). Since uk → u, there exists k′ such that
||uk′ − u|| < ζ/4. Denote uk′by y. Then y ∈ int(U0) and ||y − u|| < ζ/4.
Finally, the existence of α ∈ U0 such that yi > αi for all i follows immediately from y ∈ int(U0).
Case B: n = 2 and U0 6= ∅.
Then there exists u ∈ U0 such that ui > vi, for all i. This, together with ui ≥ vi, imply that
there exists y ∈ U0 such that ||y − u|| < ζ/4 (take an appropriate convex combination of u and
u). Also, since yi > vi ≥ ui(m¯) for all i, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λy + (1 − λ)u(m¯) ∈ U0.
Denote λy + (1− λ)u(m¯) by α. Then, α ∈ U0 and yi > αi for all i.
Claim 3 For any y ∈ U0 and ξ > 0, there exists δ˜ ∈ (0, 1) and a confusion proof single path p˜i such
that ‖V t(p˜i)− y‖ < 3ξ for all t ∈ N and for all δ ≥ δ˜.
In order to prove Claim 3, fix any y ∈ U0 and ξ > 0. Let K ∈ N be such that D ⊆ ∪x∈DKBξ(x)
and δ˜ ∈ (0, 1) be such that for all δ ≥ δ˜
sup
x∈[−M,M ]K
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δK
K∑
k=1
δk−1xk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
xk
∣∣∣∣∣ < ξ. (45)
Let δ ≥ δ˜. Let {s¯k}Kk=1 be such that∥∥∥∥∥ 1K
K∑
k=1
u(s¯k)− y
∥∥∥∥∥ < ξ.
Since Si is connected for all i, there exist a (finite) sequence {sk}Kk=1 such that |ui(st)− ui(s¯t)| < ξ
for all i and t and sti 6= srj for all 1 ≤ t, r ≤ K and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n satisfying (i, t) 6= (j, r). Then,∥∥∥∥∥ 1K
K∑
k=1
u(sk)− 1
K
K∑
k=1
u(s¯k)
∥∥∥∥∥ < ξ
and so ∥∥∥∥∥ 1K
K∑
k=1
u(sk)− y
∥∥∥∥∥ < 2ξ.
43
Let p˜i be the repetition of {sk}. Then ||V t(p˜i)− y|| < 3ξ for all t ∈ N. This completes the proof of
Claim 3.
Now to complete the proof of Lemma 2, note that it follows from Claim 2 above that there exists
y and α ∈ U0 such that ||y − u|| < ζ/4 and yi > αi for all i. Next, consider any ξ > 0 such that
ξ < ζ
4
and yi− 3ξ > αi for all i. Then by Claim 3 above there exist δ˜ ∈ (0, 1) and a confusion proof
single path p˜i such that ‖V t(p˜i)− y‖ < 3ξ for all t ∈ N and for all δ > δ˜. Now fix any δ > δ˜ and let
u˜ = V (p˜i). Then ||u˜− u|| ≤ ||u− y||+ ||u˜− y|| < ζ/4 + 3ζ/4 = ζ and V ti (p˜i) > yi − 3ξ > αi for all i
and t ∈ N. But then u˜ ∈ C(α, δ).
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let u ∈ U0 ∩ C. Then there exists ε > 0 be such that
ui > vi + ε for all i ∈ N (46)
Moreover, since u ∈ U0 ∩ C there exists a confusion proof path pi(0) that consists of repeatedly
playing a finite sequence of action profiles {s¯k}Kk=1 such that u = 1K
∑K
k=1 u(s¯
k) for all i.
Let νi : S → R be defined by
νi(s) = max
s˜i∈Si
ui(s˜i, s−i).
Also, define Mi = maxs∈S |ui(s)|. Then, let R ∈ N be such that
Rε
2
> (Mi − ui)K, for all i ∈ N, (47)
Since S is connected and νi is continuous (by the continuity of ui and compactness of Si), then
νi(S) ⊆ R is also connected. Connectedness of S and νi(S), together with (46) and vi = νi(mi),
imply that for each i ∈ N there exists a set {b(i),t}Rt=1 ⊆ S such that
b
(i),r
l 6= pi(0),tl for all i, l ∈ N, t ∈ N and 1 ≤ r ≤ R, (48)
b
(i),r
l 6= b(j),ql for all i, j, l ∈ N, and 1 ≤ r, q ≤ R such that (i, r) 6= (j, q) (49)
ui ≥ νi(b(i),r) + ε
2
for all 1 ≤ r ≤ R, (50)
if n = 2 then b(i) = b(j). (51)
By the connectedness of S and continuity of vi, the above four conditions hold because for n > 2
there exists a continnum of actions profiles Bi ⊆ S such that ||νi(b)−vi|| < ε/2 for all i and b ∈ Bi,
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and when n = 2 there exists a continnum of actions profiles B such that ||νi(b)−pii(m21,m12)|| < ε/2,
for all i = 1, 2, where as before (m21,m
1
2) is the mutual minmax strategies.
We next show that
1
q +R
[
νi(pi
(0),q) +
q−1∑
r=1
ui(pi
(0),r) +
R∑
r=1
ui(b
(i),r)
]
≤ ui, (52)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and q ∈ N. To show this let q = m+ d where m, d ∈ N0, m is a multiple of K and
0 ≤ d < K. Then, by condition (47) and (50), we have
1
q +R
[
νi(pi
(0),q) +
q−1∑
r=1
ui(pi
(0),r) +
R∑
r=1
ui(b
(i),r)
]
=
1
m+ d+R
[
νi(pi
(0),q) +mui +
d−1∑
r=1
ui(pi
(0),r) +
R∑
r=1
ui(b
(i),r)
]
≤
1
m+ d+R
[
dMi +mui +
R∑
r=1
ui(b
(i),r)
]
<
1
m+ d+R
[
dui +
Rε
2
+mui +R
(
ui − ε
2
)]
≤ ui.
Furthermore, since ui(a) ≤ νi(a) for any a, it follows from (50) that
1
t
[
νi(b
(i),t) +
t−1∑
r=1
ui(b
(i),r)
]
+
ε
2
≤ ui, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ t ≤ R. (53)
Next, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n , define the path pi(i) as follows:
pi(i),t =
 b(i),t if t ≤ R,pi(0),t−R if t > R.
Let f be the strategy profile defined by (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)). Since pi(0) is confusion proof single path
it follows from Proposition 1, (48) and (49) that f has 1 – memory. Using (52) and (53), we now
show that f is a SPE.
Consider any history h = (s1, . . . , st−1). Since f |h induces the same outcome path as pi(0) at
some stage it follows that U∞i (f |h) = ui, for all i.
Next consider any deviation by player i to another strategy f ′i at h. Let pi(f
′
i , f−i|h) = {s˜τ}∞τ=t.
Since players use the limit of the mean criterion, it is enough to consider the case in which f ′i
deviates from fi infinitely often in the subgame defined by h. Thus, suppose that there is an infinite
sequence {µτ}τ∈N with µτ ≥ t, such that:
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1. either [s˜µ
τ
−i = pi
(0),k
−i and s˜
µτ
i 6= pi(0),ki for some k ∈ N] or [s˜µ
τ
−i = b
(i),r
−i and s˜
µτ
i 6= b(i),ri ],15
2. s˜µ
τ+r = b(i),r if 1 ≤ r < min{µτ+1 − µτ , R + 1}.
3. s˜µ
τ+r = pi(0),r−R if R + 1 ≤ r < µτ+1 − µτ .
Then,
U∞i (f
′
i , f−i|h) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n+ 1
n∑
µ=0
ui(s˜
t+µ)
= lim inf
n→∞
1
µn+1 − t+ 1
 µ1∑
µ=t
ui(s˜
µ) +
n∑
τ=1
µτ+1∑
µ=µτ+1
ui(s˜
µ)
 = lim inf
n→∞
1
µn+1 − µ1
n∑
τ=1
µτ+1∑
µ=µτ+1
ui(s˜
µ).
Now for any τ , if µτ+1 − µτ = r ≤ R, then
µτ+1∑
µ=µτ+1
ui(s˜
µ) ≤
r−1∑
k=1
(
ui(b
(i),k) + νi(b
(i),r)
) ≤ rui,
where the second inequality follows from (53). If µτ+1 − µτ > R, then
µτ+1∑
µ=µτ+1
ui(s˜
µ) ≤
R∑
r=1
ui(b
(i),r) +
µτ+1−µτ−R−1∑
r=1
ui(pi
(0),r) + νi(pi
(0),µτ+1−µτ−R) ≤ (µτ+1 − µτ )ui,
where the last inequality follows from (52). Therefore, U∞i ((f
′
i , f−i|h)) ≤ ui ≤ U∞i (f |h)). This
completes the proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 3. Let u ∈ U and ζ > 0. Since U0 is nonempty, there exists y ∈ U0
and ξ > 0 such that ||u − y|| < ξ, yi − vi > ξ for all i and ξ ≤ ζ/2 (let x ∈ U0 and consider
y = λu+ (1− λ)x for some λ ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently close to 1).
Let K ∈ N be such that D ⊆ ∪x∈DKBξ/2(x). Then there exists a sequence {s¯k}Kk=1 be such that∥∥∥∥∥ 1K
K∑
k=1
u(s¯k)− y
∥∥∥∥∥ < ξ2 . (54)
Since Si is connected for all i, there exist a (finite) sequence {sk}Kk=1 such that |ui(sk)−ui(s¯k)| < ξ/2
for all i and k and sti 6= srj for all 1 ≤ t, r ≤ K and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n satisfying (i, t) 6= (j, r). Then,∥∥∥∥∥ 1K
K∑
k=1
u(sk)− 1
K
K∑
k=1
u(s¯k)
∥∥∥∥∥ < ξ2 (55)
15If τ = 1 it can also be that s˜µ
1
−i = pi
(j),k
−i and s˜
µ1
i 6= pi(j),ki for some k ∈ N and j 6∈ {0, i}.
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and so ∥∥∥∥∥ 1K
K∑
k=1
u(sk)− y
∥∥∥∥∥ < ξ.
Finally, let p˜i be the repetition of {sk}Kk=1 and u˜ = V ∞(p˜i) =
∑K
k=1 u(s
k)/K. Then, ||u− u˜|| < 2ξ
and u˜i > vi; hence u˜ ∈ U0∩C. Thus, by Theorem 4, there exists a 1 – memory SPE strategy profile
f with U∞(f) = u˜. Moreover, since ||u˜− u|| < 2ξ ≤ ζ, it follows that ‖U∞(f)− u‖ < ζ.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let u ∈ int(U0) and α ∈ int(U0) be such that ui > αi for all i.
Since int(U0) is non-empty it follows that dim(U) = n. Then, by Proposition 5, there exists δˆ such
that that for all δ ≥ δˆ the following holds: for all payoffs u′ ∈ C˜(α, δ) there exists time dependent
1 – memory SPE f with U(f) = u′. Let ε = mini(ui − vi). Also, denote the discount factor
corresponding to ε, given in Lemma 2 of Fudenberg and Maskin (1991), by δ¯.
Let δ∗ = max{δˆ, δ¯}. Fix any δ > δ∗. Then, by the definition of δ¯ there exists a sequence of
actions {st}∞t=1 whose payoff is u and whose continuation payoffs at each time are within ε of u.
This implies that the continuation payoffs of {st}∞t=1 at each date are above α. Thus, u ∈ C˜(α, δ).
Hence, since δ ≥ δˆ, by the definition of δˆ there exists a time dependent 1 – memory SPE strategy
f such that U(f) = u.
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